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Issue title

Code quality scan: 20 findings (B, 76/100)

Issue body (markdown)

Hi @rails, an automated scan of this repository surfaced **20 code-quality findings** that may be worth a look. 
Full details, severity filters, and per-file context are at the link below — feel free to close this issue if it isn't useful to you.

## Full interactive report

**https://repobility.com/scan/3eeb1910-4d08-4be7-b475-8aae92530237/**

![Live scan page](https://repobility.com/scan/3eeb1910-4d08-4be7-b475-8aae92530237/report.png?v=1778938237)

## At a glance

- **Score**: `76/100`  •  **Grade**: `B`
- **Scanned**: `2026-05-16 13:30 UTC`
- **Lines of code**: 32,034
- **Total findings**: 20
- **Security-tagged**: 4
- **Credential / secret patterns**: 0

## Top issues, with file & line

_These are deterministic rule-based findings — the file paths and line numbers below are real and can be verified in your tree._

1. **[high]** [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches. — `actionmailbox/app/controllers/rails/conductor/action_mailbox/inbound_emails_controller.rb:20`
   _Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching:   ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'}   host = urlparse(url).hostname   if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400)…_
2. **[high]** [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches. — `actionmailbox/app/controllers/rails/conductor/action_mailbox/reroutes_controller.rb:12`
   _Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching:   ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'}   host = urlparse(url).hostname   if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400)…_
3. **[high]** [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches. — `actionmailbox/app/controllers/rails/conductor/action_mailbox/inbound_emails/sources_controller.rb:12`
   _Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching:   ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'}   host = urlparse(url).hostname   if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400)…_
4. **[high]** [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: ANY /:inbound_email_id/reroute. — `actionmailbox/config/routes.rb:23`
   _Add ownership, tenant, relationship, or policy checks before reading or mutating the target object._
5. **[high]** [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: ANY /:inbound_email_id/incinerate. — `actionmailbox/config/routes.rb:24`
   _Add ownership, tenant, relationship, or policy checks before reading or mutating the target object._

See all 20 findings, with severity filters and AI fix prompts: **https://repobility.com/scan/3eeb1910-4d08-4be7-b475-8aae92530237/**

---

**What is this?** [Repobility](https://repobility.com) is a research project that scans public repositories with a multi-layer static analyzer (rule-based, no AI hallucinations) and learns code-quality patterns across a broad cross-repo corpus. This is **not a sales pitch** — there's no paywall, no signup required to view the report, and no payment ask. If the findings aren't useful, please close this issue and we won't post again.

**To re-run after fixes land:** paste your repo URL at [repobility.com](https://repobility.com) — fresh scan, free.

_Issue filed via the public Repobility report at https://repobility.com/scan/3eeb1910-4d08-4be7-b475-8aae92530237/._
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