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Issue title

Code quality scan: 16 findings (B+, 70/100)

Issue body (markdown)

Hi @DanOps-1, an automated scan of this repository surfaced **16 code-quality findings** that may be worth a look. 
Full details, severity filters, and per-file context are at the link below — feel free to close this issue if it isn't useful to you.

## Full interactive report

**https://repobility.com/scan/6af2fc05-432f-4cf8-b415-4aa1a7b84868/**

![Live scan page](https://repobility.com/scan/6af2fc05-432f-4cf8-b415-4aa1a7b84868/report.png?v=1778981803)

## At a glance

- **Score**: `70/100`  •  **Grade**: `B+`
- **Scanned**: `2026-05-17 01:36 UTC`
- **Lines of code**: 39,914
- **Total findings**: 16
- **Security-tagged**: 3
- **Credential / secret patterns**: 2

## Top issues, with file & line

_These are deterministic rule-based findings — the file paths and line numbers below are real and can be verified in your tree._

1. **[high]** [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches. — `CTF-pay/card.py:3351`
   _Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching:   ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'}   host = urlparse(url).hostname   if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400)…_
2. **[high]** [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches. — `CTF-pay/hcaptcha_auto_solver.py:101`
   _Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching:   ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'}   host = urlparse(url).hostname   if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400)…_
3. **[high]** [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches. — `CTF-reg/auth_flow.py:472`
   _Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching:   ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'}   host = urlparse(url).hostname   if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400)…_
4. **[high]** [SEC020] Secret Printed to Logs: Debug or diagnostic code appears to print a credential-bearing value. This is a frequent AI-assisted coding failure: the helper exposes the exact value needed for troubleshooting. — `CTF-reg/browser_register.py:152`
   _Log only redacted, hashed, or last-four-style metadata. Rotate any secret that may have reached logs._
5. **[high]** [SEC020] Secret Printed to Logs: Debug or diagnostic code appears to print a credential-bearing value. This is a frequent AI-assisted coding failure: the helper exposes the exact value needed for troubleshooting. — `CTF-reg/sentinel_v1_legacy.py:123`
   _Log only redacted, hashed, or last-four-style metadata. Rotate any secret that may have reached logs._

See all 16 findings, with severity filters and AI fix prompts: **https://repobility.com/scan/6af2fc05-432f-4cf8-b415-4aa1a7b84868/**

---

**What is this?** [Repobility](https://repobility.com) is a research project that scans public repositories with a multi-layer static analyzer (rule-based, no AI hallucinations) and learns code-quality patterns across a broad cross-repo corpus. This is **not a sales pitch** — there's no paywall, no signup required to view the report, and no payment ask. If the findings aren't useful, please close this issue and we won't post again.

**To re-run after fixes land:** paste your repo URL at [repobility.com](https://repobility.com) — fresh scan, free.

_Issue filed via the public Repobility report at https://repobility.com/scan/6af2fc05-432f-4cf8-b415-4aa1a7b84868/._
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