NousResearch/hermes-agent
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Code quality scan: 102 findings (A-, 75/100)
Hi @NousResearch, an automated scan of this repository surfaced **102 code-quality findings** that may be worth a look.
Full details, severity filters, and per-file context are at the link below — feel free to close this issue if it isn't useful to you.
## Full interactive report
**https://repobility.com/scan/babdf5bb-90da-4ecd-a31d-8963b056e767/**

## At a glance
- **Score**: `75/100` • **Grade**: `A-`
- **Scanned**: `2026-05-17 02:56 UTC`
- **Lines of code**: 934,511
- **Total findings**: 102
- **Security-tagged**: 48
- **Credential / secret patterns**: 6
## Top issues, with file & line
_These are deterministic rule-based findings — the file paths and line numbers below are real and can be verified in your tree._
1. **[high]** [SEC018] AI-Agent Secret Retrieval Command: A command that prints or embeds credentials was committed. AI coding agents often add these commands while trying to help with setup or deployment, but they can leak live secrets through logs, shell history, CI output, or documentation. — `agent/auxiliary_client.py:3167`
_Remove the command, use a secret manager or CI masked secret, and rotate any credential that may have been printed._
2. **[high]** [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches. — `agent/anthropic_adapter.py:827`
_Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400)…_
3. **[high]** [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches. — `agent/account_usage.py:116`
_Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400)…_
4. **[high]** [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches. — `acp_adapter/server.py:141`
_Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400)…_
5. **[high]** [SEC018] AI-Agent Secret Retrieval Command: A command that prints or embeds credentials was committed. AI coding agents often add these commands while trying to help with setup or deployment, but they can leak live secrets through logs, shell history, CI output, or documentation. — `agent/credential_sources.py:10`
_Remove the command, use a secret manager or CI masked secret, and rotate any credential that may have been printed._
See all 102 findings, with severity filters and AI fix prompts: **https://repobility.com/scan/babdf5bb-90da-4ecd-a31d-8963b056e767/**
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_Issue filed via the public Repobility report at https://repobility.com/scan/babdf5bb-90da-4ecd-a31d-8963b056e767/._
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