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romaine-life/ambience

https://github.com/romaine-life/ambience · scanned 2026-06-15 23:55 UTC (2 months, 3 weeks ago)

49 raw signals (0 security + 49 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 3 weeks ago · v1 · 31 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 18 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 31 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 1 High 2 Medium 12 Low 10 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 31 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 1 Hardware 5 Frontend 1 Security 4 Cicd 4 Quality 16

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 52.2/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 540 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 49 findings — concentrated in cicd (20), quality (16), hardware (7). Risk profile is high: 1 critical, 4 high, 24 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 25 of 31 actionable findings. 49 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in mcp/ambience_preview/ops.py

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

mcp/ambience_preview/ops.py:540

high System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 3 occurrences Dockerfile pipes a remote installer into a shell

Executing downloaded code during image build gives the remote endpoint build-time code execution. Prefer pinned packages or verify downloaded installers by checksum/signature.

lines 52, 60, 66

.github/runner/Dockerfile:52, 60, 66 (3 hits)

containersRemote installer

high System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action tracks a moving branch

romaine-life/pipeline-templates/.github/workflows/tofu-plan-apply-template.yml@main can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/tofu.yaml:23 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — cmd/ambience/web/wasm_runtime.js:37

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/launch.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/launch.json VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image uses a mutable or implicit tag: ghcr.io/actions/actions-runner:latest

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

.github/runner/Dockerfile:1 containersPinned dependencies

medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: .github/runner/Dockerfile

No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.

Container

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 10 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

azure/login@v3 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

3 files, 10 locations

.github/workflows/docker-build-check.yaml:116, 120, 162, 177 (4 hits)

.github/workflows/build-and-deploy.yml:63, 73, 108 (3 hits)

.github/workflows/build-native-runner-image.yml:68, 78, 113 (3 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 4 occurrences GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

4 files, 4 locations

.github/workflows/build-and-deploy.yml

.github/workflows/build-native-runner-image.yml

.github/workflows/docker-build-check.yaml

.github/workflows/tofu.yaml

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in cmd/ambience/main.go:338

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

cmd/ambience/main.go:338 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in cmd/ambience/web/chrome.js:26

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

cmd/ambience/web/chrome.js:26 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in cmd/ambience/web/controls.js:115

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

cmd/ambience/web/controls.js:115 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — mcp/ambience_preview/ops.py:43

`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.

runtime safetyRobustness

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 8 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

Dockerfile:19 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: golang:1.26-alpine

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

Dockerfile:4 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 5 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

3 files, 5 locations

.github/workflows/docker-build-check.yaml:26, 51, 83 (3 hits)

.github/workflows/build-and-deploy.yml:31

.github/workflows/build-native-runner-image.yml:34

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Multiple root agent instruction files without precedence

The repo has multiple top-level AI-coder instruction files. Without precedence rules, different agents may follow different policies.

Governance

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: preview_url

No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.

mcp/ambience_preview/ops.py:130

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: mcp/ambience_preview/ops.py (1447 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: sim/procedural_renderers.go (1812 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

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