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weijiafu14/cc-sandbox-server

https://github.com/weijiafu14/cc-sandbox-server · scanned 2026-06-16 00:56 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

17 raw signals (0 security + 17 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 17 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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77.8% cov · 17 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 7 Low 4 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 17 Crowd 0 Layer: Hardware 3 Frontend 1 Security 2 Cicd 1 Quality 10

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 75.7/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 97 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 17 findings — concentrated in quality (10), hardware (3), security (2). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 7 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 11 of 17 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/toolServer.ts:322

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap

Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: ci, tests, lockfile. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: examples/docker/Dockerfile

No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.

Container

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/remoteClient.ts:21

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/remoteClient.ts:21 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/toolServer.ts:28

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/toolServer.ts:28 Node child process

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected

No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.

CI/CD securityCoverage

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

0 test file(s) for 6 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found

Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.

Deployment

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: oven/bun:1-slim

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

examples/docker/Dockerfile:10 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph quality dependencies conf 1.00 Node manifest has dependencies but no lockfile: package.json

`package.json` declares dependencies, but no same-directory npm/pnpm/yarn/bun lockfile was found. Generated projects without lockfiles are less reproducible and harder to secure-scan precisely.

package.json LockfileReproducibilityGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

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