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turboladen/fewd

https://github.com/turboladen/fewd · scanned 2026-06-16 00:43 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

31 raw signals (0 security + 31 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 28 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 3 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
70.4
/100
Security checks
70
0 findings
System graph
70
100.0% cov · 28 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 9 Low 14 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 28 Crowd 0 Layer: Security 2 Cicd 3 Quality 15 Api 8
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 70.4/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 783 nodes across 17 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 31 findings — concentrated in quality (15), api (8), cicd (6). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 10 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 24 of 28 actionable findings. 31 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: CLAUDE.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
CLAUDE.md:336 SecretsClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/lib/api.ts:43
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/settings.json
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/settings.json VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Frontend route `/recipes/:id` has no Link/navigate to it — src/routes/RecipeDetailPrint.test.tsx
The route is registered but no `<Link to=…>` or `navigate(…)` in the codebase navigates here. Either it's reachable only via direct URL (intentional), it's dead, or the link broke during a refactor.
Orphan pageWiring
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
lines 26, 82
.github/workflows/ci.yml:26, 82 (2 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/auto-format.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 69 placeholder/mock markers across 17 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/cache@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
lines 31, 37, 43
.github/workflows/ci.yml:31, 37, 43 (3 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: DELETE /bar-items/
`src/hooks/useBarItems.ts` declares `DELETE /bar-items/` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: DELETE /bar-items/all
`src/hooks/useBarItems.ts` declares `DELETE /bar-items/all` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: DELETE /drink-recipes/
`src/hooks/useDrinkRecipes.ts` declares `DELETE /drink-recipes/` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: DELETE /meal-templates/
`src/hooks/useMealTemplates.ts` declares `DELETE /meal-templates/` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: DELETE /meals/
`src/hooks/useMeals.ts` declares `DELETE /meals/` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: DELETE /people/
`src/hooks/usePeople.ts` declares `DELETE /people/` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: DELETE /recipes/
`src/hooks/useRecipes.ts` declares `DELETE /recipes/` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: PUT /settings/
`src/hooks/useSettings.ts` declares `PUT /settings/` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: server/src/mcp/handler.rs (2331 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: server/src/services/printable_service.rs (1366 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: server/tests/service_tests.rs (3569 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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