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sheer-creator/alva-freshman

https://github.com/sheer-creator/alva-freshman · scanned 2026-06-16 00:10 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

79 raw signals (0 security + 79 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 79 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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77.8% cov · 79 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 27 Low 9 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 79 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 35 Security 14 Cicd 2 Quality 28

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 56.2/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 1761 nodes across 30 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 79 findings — concentrated in frontend (35), quality (28), security (14). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 27 medium. Recommended next step: open the frontend layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 35 of 79 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — src/lib/playbook-cover/PlaybookCover.tsx:133

Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — src/pages/UserProfile.tsx:121

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/lib/playbook-cover/BrandLogo.tsx:7

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/lib/playbook-cover/image-fetcher.ts:9

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/pages/OpenAlvaDocs.tsx:353

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/launch.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/launch.json VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected

A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.

CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

peaceiris/actions-gh-pages@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/deploy.yml:32 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/deploy.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in src/lib/playbook-cover/PlaybookCover.tsx:133

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

src/lib/playbook-cover/PlaybookCover.tsx:133 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in src/pages/UserProfile.tsx:121

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

src/pages/UserProfile.tsx:121 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in public/demo/_switcher.js:51