low Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility 3 occurrences [MINED007] Sql String Concat: cursor.execute(f"... {user_input} ...") — SQL injection.

Review and fix per the pattern semantics. See CWE-89 / A03:2021 for context.

3 files, 3 locations

skills/exploiting-insecure-data-storage-in-mobile/scripts/agent.py:76

skills/exploiting-insecure-data-storage-in-mobile/scripts/process.py:112

skills/performing-mobile-device-forensics-with-cellebrite/scripts/agent.py:154

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility 25 occurrences [MINED107] Missing import: `http` used but not imported: The file uses `http.something(...)` but never imports `http`. This raises NameError at runtime the first time the line executes.

Add `import http` at the top of the file.

12 files, 12 locations

skills/analyzing-network-traffic-of-malware/scripts/agent.py:162

skills/analyzing-persistence-mechanisms-in-linux/scripts/agent.py:125

skills/conducting-pass-the-ticket-attack/scripts/agent.py:121

skills/configuring-host-based-intrusion-detection/scripts/agent.py:79

skills/detecting-kerberoasting-attacks/scripts/agent.py:30

skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/scripts/agent.py:40

skills/detecting-ransomware-encryption-behavior/scripts/agent.py:191

skills/hunting-for-anomalous-powershell-execution/scripts/agent.py:66

critical Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 9 occurrences [MINED127] Cryptominer signature: `minergate.com`: Source contains a known cryptominer signature (`minergate.com`). Could be a deliberate malicious payload, a compromised dependency, or a copy-paste from a tutorial — but it warrants immediate investigation. Mining pool URLs in production code are almost never legitimate.

Verify the file's provenance — when was it added, by whom, in what PR. Search the repo for related indicators (binary blobs, outbound network calls, base64-encoded shell scripts).

4 files, 9 locations

skills/detecting-cryptomining-in-cloud/scripts/agent.py:12, 13, 14 (4 hits)

skills/implementing-cloud-workload-protection/scripts/agent.py:62 (2 hits)

skills/implementing-ebpf-security-monitoring/scripts/agent.py:47, 50 (2 hits)

skills/implementing-runtime-security-with-tetragon/scripts/process.py:134

critical Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED133] Hardcoded Slack webhook URL in source: File contains a hardcoded `Slack` webhook URL: `https://hooks.slack.com/services/XXX/YYY/ZZZ...`. Webhook URLs are unauthenticated POST endpoints — anyone with the URL can send messages. They are also a common data-exfiltration channel for compromised packages (malicious post-install collects env vars + POSTs them).

Move the URL to a secret manager / environment variable. Rotate the webhook immediately if this is a live URL (consider it compromised the moment it landed in git).

skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/scripts/agent.py:905

critical Security checks security Crypto conf 1.00 [SEC039] Plaintext-equivalent password hash — unsalted single-pass digest: Single-pass digest of a password is cryptographically strong as a hash, but is rainbow-table-attackable when used for passwords: there's no salt and no key-stretching. Attackers with the hash database can crack 90%+ of common passwords offline in hours. CWE-916 (use of password hash without computational effort).

Use a purpose-built password hash: - Python: passlib.hash.argon2.hash(password) - Python: bcrypt.hashpw(password.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt()) - Python: hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha256', password, salt, 600000) - PHP: password_hash($password, PASSWORD_ARGON2ID) - Node.js: argon2.hash(password) …

skills/performing-hash-cracking-with-hashcat/scripts/process.py:127

critical Security checks security Crypto conf 1.00 [SEC039] Plaintext-equivalent password hash — unsalted single-pass digest: Single-pass digest of a password is cryptographically strong as a hash, but is rainbow-table-attackable when used for passwords: there's no salt and no key-stretching. Attackers with the hash database can crack 90%+ of common passwords offline in hours. CWE-916 (use of password hash without computational effort).

Use a purpose-built password hash: - Python: passlib.hash.argon2.hash(password) - Python: bcrypt.hashpw(password.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt()) - Python: hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha256', password, salt, 600000) - PHP: password_hash($password, PASSWORD_ARGON2ID) - Node.js: argon2.hash(password) …

skills/performing-dark-web-monitoring-for-threats/scripts/agent.py:90

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 2 occurrences Possible secret in skills/building-red-team-c2-infrastructure-with-havoc/SKILL.md

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

lines 131, 134

skills/building-red-team-c2-infrastructure-with-havoc/SKILL.md:131, 134 (2 hits)

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 2 occurrences Possible secret in skills/deploying-active-directory-honeytokens/scripts/agent.py

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

lines 242, 280

skills/deploying-active-directory-honeytokens/scripts/agent.py:242, 280 (2 hits)

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in skills/exploiting-active-directory-with-bloodhound/scripts/agent.py

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

skills/exploiting-active-directory-with-bloodhound/scripts/agent.py:68

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 2 occurrences Possible secret in skills/implementing-network-access-control/SKILL.md

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

lines 88, 311

skills/implementing-network-access-control/SKILL.md:88, 311 (2 hits)

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 2 occurrences Possible secret in skills/implementing-secret-scanning-with-gitleaks/SKILL.md

Detected pattern matching aws_secret. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

lines 107, 259

skills/implementing-secret-scanning-with-gitleaks/SKILL.md:107, 259 (2 hits)

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in skills/implementing-secrets-management-with-vault/SKILL.md

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

skills/implementing-secrets-management-with-vault/SKILL.md:147

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 2 occurrences Possible secret in skills/implementing-security-information-sharing-with-stix2/SKILL.md

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

lines 298, 312

skills/implementing-security-information-sharing-with-stix2/SKILL.md:298, 312 (2 hits)

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in skills/implementing-zero-knowledge-proof-for-authentication/scripts/agent.py

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

skills/implementing-zero-knowledge-proof-for-authentication/scripts/agent.py:85

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 3 occurrences Possible secret in skills/performing-cryptographic-audit-of-application/scripts/process.py

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

lines 281, 282

skills/performing-cryptographic-audit-of-application/scripts/process.py:281, 282 (3 hits)

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 2 occurrences Possible secret in skills/performing-wifi-password-cracking-with-aircrack/SKILL.md

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

lines 268, 273

skills/performing-wifi-password-cracking-with-aircrack/SKILL.md:268, 273 (2 hits)

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in skills/performing-wireless-security-assessment-with-kismet/scripts/agent.py

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

skills/performing-wireless-security-assessment-with-kismet/scripts/agent.py:21

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 2 occurrences Possible secret in skills/processing-stix-taxii-feeds/SKILL.md

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

lines 61, 77

skills/processing-stix-taxii-feeds/SKILL.md:61, 77 (2 hits)

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in skills/securing-container-registry-with-harbor/scripts/agent.py

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

skills/securing-container-registry-with-harbor/scripts/agent.py:172

critical System graph security Skillspector conf 0.85 SkillSpector YR1 (yara) in skills/analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration/assets/template.md

CobaltStrike YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer). Skill: analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration Rule: YR1 Category: yara Severity: CRITICAL Confidence: 0.85 Remediation: Remove the malware payload or compromised…

skills/analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration/assets/template.md:77 Mcp skillYaraYr1

critical System graph security Skillspector conf 0.85 SkillSpector YR1 (yara) in skills/analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration/references/api-reference.md

CobaltStrike; CobaltStrike; BeaconType; C2Server; BeaconType; C2Server YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer). Skill: analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration Rule: YR1 Category: yara Severity: CRITICAL Confidence: 0.…

skills/analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration/references/api-reference.md:40 Mcp skillYaraYr1

critical System graph security Skillspector conf 0.85 SkillSpector YR1 (yara) in skills/analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration/references/standards.md

cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; BeaconType; C2Server YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer). Skill: analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration Rule: YR1 Category: yara Severity: CRITICAL Confidence: 0.85 Remediation: Remov…

skills/analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration/references/standards.md:92 Mcp skillYaraYr1

critical System graph security Skillspector conf 0.85 SkillSpector YR1 (yara) in skills/analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration/scripts/agent.py

BeaconType; C2Server; BeaconType; C2Server YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer). Skill: analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration Rule: YR1 Category: yara Severity: CRITICAL Confidence: 0.85 Remediation: Remove the …

skills/analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration/scripts/agent.py:16 Mcp skillYaraYr1

critical System graph security Skillspector conf 0.85 SkillSpector YR1 (yara) in skills/analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration/scripts/process.py

cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; BeaconType; C2Server; BeaconType; C2Server YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer). Skill: analyzing-cobalt-stri…

skills/analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration/scripts/process.py:6 Mcp skillYaraYr1

critical System graph security Skillspector conf 0.85 SkillSpector YR1 (yara) in skills/analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration/SKILL.md

cobaltstrike; CobaltStrike; CobaltStrike; CobaltStrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; CobaltStrike; cobaltstrike; CobaltStrike; CobaltStrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; coba YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, o…

skills/analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration/SKILL.md:47 Mcp skillYaraYr1

critical System graph security Skillspector conf 0.85 SkillSpector YR1 (yara) in skills/analyzing-cobaltstrike-malleable-c2-profiles/references/api-reference.md

CobaltStrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; CobaltStrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer). Skill: analyzing-cobaltstrike-malleable-c2-p…

skills/analyzing-cobaltstrike-malleable-c2-profiles/references/api-reference.md:1 Mcp skillYaraYr1

critical System graph security Skillspector conf 0.85 SkillSpector YR1 (yara) in skills/analyzing-cobaltstrike-malleable-c2-profiles/scripts/agent.py

CobaltStrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; CobaltStrike; cobaltstrike; CobaltStrike YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer). Skill: analyzing-cobaltstrike-malleable-c2-profiles Rule: YR1 Category: yara Severity: CRITICAL Co…

skills/analyzing-cobaltstrike-malleable-c2-profiles/scripts/agent.py:2 Mcp skillYaraYr1

critical System graph security Skillspector conf 0.85 SkillSpector YR1 (yara) in skills/analyzing-cobaltstrike-malleable-c2-profiles/SKILL.md

cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; CobaltStrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike; cobaltstrike YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer). Skill: analyzing-cobaltstrike-malleable-c2-profiles Rule: YR1 Category: yara Severity…

skills/analyzing-cobaltstrike-malleable-c2-profiles/SKILL.md:2 Mcp skillYaraYr1

critical System graph security Skillspector conf 0.85 SkillSpector YR1 (yara) in skills/analyzing-command-and-control-communication/references/api-reference.md

CobaltStrike; BeaconType; C2Server YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer). Skill: analyzing-command-and-control-communication Rule: YR1 Category: yara Severity: CRITICAL Confidence: 0.85 Remediation: Remove the malware p…

skills/analyzing-command-and-control-communication/references/api-reference.md:76 Mcp skillYaraYr1

critical System graph security Skillspector conf 0.85 SkillSpector YR1 (yara) in skills/analyzing-command-and-control-communication/scripts/agent.py

Meterpreter YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer). Skill: analyzing-command-and-control-communication Rule: YR1 Category: yara Severity: CRITICAL Confidence: 0.85 Remediation: Remove the malware payload or compromised f…

skills/analyzing-command-and-control-communication/scripts/agent.py:138 Mcp skillYaraYr1

critical System graph security Skillspector conf 0.85 SkillSpector YR1 (yara) in skills/analyzing-command-and-control-communication/SKILL.md

CobaltStrike; CobaltStrike; CobaltStrike; Meterpreter; Meterpreter YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer). Skill: analyzing-command-and-control-communication Rule: YR1 Category: yara Severity: CRITICAL Confidence: 0.85 R…

skills/analyzing-command-and-control-communication/SKILL.md:188 Mcp skillYaraYr1

critical System graph security Skillspector conf 0.85 SkillSpector YR1 (yara) in skills/analyzing-golang-malware-with-ghidra/references/api-reference.md

Sliver | C2 implant YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer). Skill: analyzing-golang-malware-with-ghidra Rule: YR1 Category: yara Severity: CRITICAL Confidence: 0.85 Remediation: Remove the malware payload or compromised …

skills/analyzing-golang-malware-with-ghidra/references/api-reference.md:76 Mcp skillYaraYr1

critical System graph security Skillspector conf 0.85 SkillSpector YR1 (yara) in skills/analyzing-golang-malware-with-ghidra/references/standards.md

Sliver C2 implant YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer). Skill: analyzing-golang-malware-with-ghidra Rule: YR1 Category: yara Severity: CRITICAL Confidence: 0.85 Remediation: Remove the malware payload or compromised fi…

skills/analyzing-golang-malware-with-ghidra/references/standards.md:21 Mcp skillYaraYr1

critical System graph security Semgrep conf 1.00 subprocess shell true — skills/performing-threat-emulation-with-atomic-red-team/scripts/agent.py:100

Found 'subprocess' function 'run' with 'shell=True'. This is dangerous because this call will spawn the command using a shell process. Doing so propagates current shell settings and variables, which makes it much easier for a malicious actor to execute commands. Use 'shell=False' instead. Rule: py…

SecurityPython

critical System graph security Semgrep conf 1.00 subprocess shell true — skills/performing-threat-emulation-with-atomic-red-team/scripts/agent.py:131

Found 'subprocess' function 'run' with 'shell=True'. This is dangerous because this call will spawn the command using a shell process. Doing so propagates current shell settings and variables, which makes it much easier for a malicious actor to execute commands. Use 'shell=False' instead. Rule: py…

SecurityPython

low Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility 3 occurrences [MINED006] Overcatch Baseexception: except BaseException: ... — prevents Ctrl+C and SystemExit from working.

Review and fix per the pattern semantics. See CWE-705 / for context.

3 files, 3 locations

skills/conducting-man-in-the-middle-attack-simulation/scripts/agent.py:131

skills/hunting-for-startup-folder-persistence/scripts/agent.py:230

skills/implementing-honeypot-for-ransomware-detection/scripts/process.py:236

low Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED012] Curl Pipe Bash: curl ... | sh / bash — runs unverified network code.

Review and fix per the pattern semantics. See CWE-494 / A08:2021 for context.

skills/securing-container-registry-images/scripts/agent.py:58

low Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED012] Curl Pipe Bash: curl ... | sh / bash — runs unverified network code.

Review and fix per the pattern semantics. See CWE-494 / A08:2021 for context.

skills/scanning-container-images-with-grype/scripts/agent.py:35

low Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility 3 occurrences [MINED021] Path Traversal Os Join: os.path.join(user_dir, filename) where filename can contain "../" — directory escape.

Review and fix per the pattern semantics. See CWE-22 / A01:2021 for context.

3 files, 3 locations

skills/collecting-volatile-evidence-from-compromised-host/scripts/agent.py:153

skills/deploying-osquery-for-endpoint-monitoring/scripts/process.py:83

skills/detecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints/scripts/process.py:53

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_alias_overloading: Test function `test_alias_overloading` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/performing-graphql-security-assessment/scripts/agent.py:139

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_batch_queries: Test function `test_batch_queries` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/performing-graphql-security-assessment/scripts/agent.py:72

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_endpoint: Test function `test_endpoint` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/bypassing-authentication-with-forced-browsing/scripts/agent.py:37

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_endpoint: Test function `test_endpoint` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/exploiting-excessive-data-exposure-in-api/scripts/agent.py:75

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_endpoint_access: Test function `test_endpoint_access` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/exploiting-broken-function-level-authorization/scripts/agent.py:25

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_field_suggestions: Test function `test_field_suggestions` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/performing-graphql-security-assessment/scripts/agent.py:92

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_freemarker_rce: Test function `test_freemarker_rce` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/exploiting-template-injection-vulnerabilities/scripts/agent.py:132

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_http_method_bypass: Test function `test_http_method_bypass` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/bypassing-authentication-with-forced-browsing/scripts/agent.py:83

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_idor_via_function: Test function `test_idor_via_function` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/exploiting-broken-function-level-authorization/scripts/agent.py:71

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_introspection: Test function `test_introspection` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/performing-graphql-security-assessment/scripts/agent.py:34

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_jinja2_rce: Test function `test_jinja2_rce` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/exploiting-template-injection-vulnerabilities/scripts/agent.py:85

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_method_switching: Test function `test_method_switching` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/exploiting-broken-function-level-authorization/scripts/agent.py:44

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_path_traversal_bypass: Test function `test_path_traversal_bypass` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/bypassing-authentication-with-forced-browsing/scripts/agent.py:97

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_privilege_escalation: Test function `test_privilege_escalation` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/exploiting-broken-function-level-authorization/scripts/agent.py:54

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_query_depth: Test function `test_query_depth` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/performing-graphql-security-assessment/scripts/agent.py:57

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_race_condition: Test function `test_race_condition` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/exploiting-race-condition-vulnerabilities/scripts/agent.py:69

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_ssti_detection: Test function `test_ssti_detection` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/exploiting-template-injection-vulnerabilities/scripts/agent.py:38

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_token_endpoint: Test function `test_token_endpoint` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/configuring-oauth2-authorization-flow/scripts/agent.py:70

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_twig_rce: Test function `test_twig_rce` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/exploiting-template-injection-vulnerabilities/scripts/agent.py:112

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED106] Phantom test coverage: test_unauthorized_access: Test function `test_unauthorized_access` runs code but contains no assert / expect / should call — it passes regardless of behaviour. Adds line coverage without verifying anything.

Add an explicit assertion that captures the test's intent, or remove the test.

skills/performing-graphql-security-assessment/scripts/agent.py:109

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility 11 occurrences [MINED108] `self.client_address` used but never assigned in __init__: Method `do_GET` of class `HoneypotHTTPHandler` reads `self.client_address`, but no assignment to it exists in __init__ (and no class-level fallback). This raises AttributeError the first time the method runs against an instance.

Initialize `self.client_address = <default>` in __init__, or add a class-level default.

lines 119, 120, 122, 123, 127, 131, 134, 135, +3 more

skills/performing-deception-technology-deployment/scripts/agent.py:119, 120, 122, 123, 127, 131, 134, 135, +3 more (11 hits)

low Security checks security Injection conf 0.50 3 occurrences [SEC004] SQL Injection Risk: String interpolation in SQL execution. Allows SQL injection.

Use parameterized queries: cursor.execute('SELECT * FROM t WHERE id = ?', [id]). For dynamic table or column names, choose identifiers from a hard-coded allowlist and keep values in parameters.

3 files, 3 locations

skills/exploiting-insecure-data-storage-in-mobile/scripts/agent.py:85

skills/exploiting-insecure-data-storage-in-mobile/scripts/process.py:125

skills/performing-sqlite-database-forensics/scripts/agent.py:149

low Security checks security Injection conf 0.80 [SEC005] Command Injection Risk: Unsafe shell execution or eval of user input.

Use subprocess with shell=False and a list of args. Never eval user input.

skills/performing-threat-hunting-with-yara-rules/scripts/agent.py:62

low Security checks security path traversal conf 0.80 3 occurrences [SEC013] Path Traversal — User Input in File Path: User-controlled input used in file path without sanitization. Allows reading arbitrary files.

Use os.path.realpath() and verify the path starts with your expected base directory. Use secure_filename() for uploads.

3 files, 3 locations

skills/achieving-cmmc-level-2-compliance/scripts/process.py:166

skills/building-ioc-defanging-and-sharing-pipeline/scripts/agent.py:151

skills/conducting-cyber-risk-assessment-with-nist-800-30/scripts/process.py:190

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 [SEC082] Python: paramiko AutoAddPolicy or no host-key verification: AutoAddPolicy / WarningPolicy disables SSH host-key verification — vulnerable to MITM. Ported from bandit B507 / dlint DUO133 (Apache-2.0 / BSD-3).

Use `paramiko.RejectPolicy()` and pre-populate known_hosts via `client.load_system_host_keys()`.

skills/performing-agentless-vulnerability-scanning/scripts/process.py:40

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 [SEC082] Python: paramiko AutoAddPolicy or no host-key verification: AutoAddPolicy / WarningPolicy disables SSH host-key verification — vulnerable to MITM. Ported from bandit B507 / dlint DUO133 (Apache-2.0 / BSD-3).

Use `paramiko.RejectPolicy()` and pre-populate known_hosts via `client.load_system_host_keys()`.

skills/implementing-syslog-centralization-with-rsyslog/scripts/agent.py:152

high Security checks security Crypto conf 1.00 [SEC113] SSH host-key verification disabled (MITM): Accepting any SSH host key on first connect lets an active MITM impersonate the server. Common in `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()`.

Python: load `~/.ssh/known_hosts` and use `paramiko.RejectPolicy()`. Go: implement a `ssh.HostKeyCallback` that compares against a known fingerprint. Java JSch: load known_hosts via `jsch.setKnownHosts(...)`.

skills/performing-agentless-vulnerability-scanning/scripts/process.py:40

high Security checks security Crypto conf 1.00 [SEC113] SSH host-key verification disabled (MITM): Accepting any SSH host key on first connect lets an active MITM impersonate the server. Common in `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()`.

Python: load `~/.ssh/known_hosts` and use `paramiko.RejectPolicy()`. Go: implement a `ssh.HostKeyCallback` that compares against a known fingerprint. Java JSch: load known_hosts via `jsch.setKnownHosts(...)`.

skills/implementing-syslog-centralization-with-rsyslog/scripts/agent.py:152

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/acquiring-disk-image-with-dd-and-dcfldd/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/acquiring-disk-image-with-dd-and-dcfldd/SKILL.md:2 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/analyzing-browser-forensics-with-hindsight/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/analyzing-browser-forensics-with-hindsight/SKILL.md:242 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/analyzing-cloud-storage-access-patterns/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/analyzing-cloud-storage-access-patterns/SKILL.md:80 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/analyzing-disk-image-with-autopsy/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/analyzing-disk-image-with-autopsy/SKILL.md:2 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/analyzing-ransomware-encryption-mechanisms/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/analyzing-ransomware-encryption-mechanisms/SKILL.md:212 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/analyzing-ransomware-leak-site-intelligence/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/analyzing-ransomware-leak-site-intelligence/SKILL.md:169 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/analyzing-windows-registry-for-artifacts/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/analyzing-windows-registry-for-artifacts/SKILL.md:177 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/auditing-cloud-with-cis-benchmarks/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/auditing-cloud-with-cis-benchmarks/SKILL.md:164 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/building-adversary-infrastructure-tracking-system/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/building-adversary-infrastructure-tracking-system/SKILL.md:49 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/building-cloud-siem-with-sentinel/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/building-cloud-siem-with-sentinel/SKILL.md:88 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/building-red-team-c2-infrastructure-with-havoc/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/building-red-team-c2-infrastructure-with-havoc/SKILL.md:317 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/building-threat-actor-profile-from-osint/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/building-threat-actor-profile-from-osint/SKILL.md:248 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/building-threat-intelligence-platform/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/building-threat-intelligence-platform/SKILL.md:124 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/building-vulnerability-dashboard-with-defectdojo/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/building-vulnerability-dashboard-with-defectdojo/SKILL.md:77 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/SKILL.md:105 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/conducting-cyber-risk-assessment-with-nist-800-30/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/conducting-cyber-risk-assessment-with-nist-800-30/SKILL.md:2 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/configuring-aws-verified-access-for-ztna/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/configuring-aws-verified-access-for-ztna/SKILL.md:191 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/configuring-identity-aware-proxy-with-google-iap/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/configuring-identity-aware-proxy-with-google-iap/SKILL.md:99 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/configuring-zscaler-private-access-for-ztna/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/configuring-zscaler-private-access-for-ztna/SKILL.md:229 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/deploying-active-directory-honeytokens/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/deploying-active-directory-honeytokens/SKILL.md:180 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/deploying-cloud-deception-with-decoy-resources/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/deploying-cloud-deception-with-decoy-resources/SKILL.md:83 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/deploying-osquery-for-endpoint-monitoring/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/deploying-osquery-for-endpoint-monitoring/SKILL.md:59 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/deploying-palo-alto-prisma-access-zero-trust/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/deploying-palo-alto-prisma-access-zero-trust/SKILL.md:95 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/deploying-tailscale-for-zero-trust-vpn/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/deploying-tailscale-for-zero-trust-vpn/SKILL.md:118 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/detecting-arp-poisoning-in-network-traffic/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/detecting-arp-poisoning-in-network-traffic/SKILL.md:353 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/detecting-attacks-on-scada-systems/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/detecting-attacks-on-scada-systems/SKILL.md:582 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/detecting-aws-credential-exposure-with-trufflehog/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/detecting-aws-credential-exposure-with-trufflehog/SKILL.md:139 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/detecting-aws-guardduty-findings-automation/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/detecting-aws-guardduty-findings-automation/SKILL.md:101 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/detecting-cloud-threats-with-guardduty/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/detecting-cloud-threats-with-guardduty/SKILL.md:106 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/detecting-compromised-cloud-credentials/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/detecting-compromised-cloud-credentials/SKILL.md:280 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/detecting-cryptomining-in-cloud/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/detecting-cryptomining-in-cloud/SKILL.md:94 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/SKILL.md:193 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/detecting-lateral-movement-in-network/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/detecting-lateral-movement-in-network/SKILL.md:241 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/detecting-misconfigured-azure-storage/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/detecting-misconfigured-azure-storage/SKILL.md:145 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/detecting-network-anomalies-with-zeek/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/detecting-network-anomalies-with-zeek/SKILL.md:215 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/detecting-s3-data-exfiltration-attempts/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/detecting-s3-data-exfiltration-attempts/SKILL.md:69 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/detecting-serverless-function-injection/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/detecting-serverless-function-injection/SKILL.md:355 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/exploiting-insecure-data-storage-in-mobile/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/exploiting-insecure-data-storage-in-mobile/SKILL.md:120 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/exploiting-jwt-algorithm-confusion-attack/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/exploiting-jwt-algorithm-confusion-attack/SKILL.md:76 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/exploiting-oauth-misconfiguration/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/exploiting-oauth-misconfiguration/SKILL.md:204 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/exploiting-websocket-vulnerabilities/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/exploiting-websocket-vulnerabilities/SKILL.md:61 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/extracting-config-from-agent-tesla-rat/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/extracting-config-from-agent-tesla-rat/SKILL.md:122 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/SKILL.md:487 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-api-abuse-detection-with-rate-limiting/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-api-abuse-detection-with-rate-limiting/SKILL.md:92 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-api-gateway-security-controls/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-api-gateway-security-controls/SKILL.md:204 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-api-key-security-controls/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-api-key-security-controls/SKILL.md:98 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-api-schema-validation-security/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-api-schema-validation-security/SKILL.md:211 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-aws-config-rules-for-compliance/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-aws-config-rules-for-compliance/SKILL.md:70 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-aws-iam-permission-boundaries/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-aws-iam-permission-boundaries/SKILL.md:115 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-aws-macie-for-data-classification/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-aws-macie-for-data-classification/SKILL.md:89 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-aws-nitro-enclave-security/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-aws-nitro-enclave-security/SKILL.md:141 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-aws-security-hub-compliance/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-aws-security-hub-compliance/SKILL.md:68 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-aws-security-hub/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-aws-security-hub/SKILL.md:67 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-beyondcorp-zero-trust-access-model/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-beyondcorp-zero-trust-access-model/SKILL.md:121 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-canary-tokens-for-network-intrusion/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-canary-tokens-for-network-intrusion/SKILL.md:108 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-cloud-security-posture-management/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-cloud-security-posture-management/SKILL.md:64 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-cloud-trail-log-analysis/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-cloud-trail-log-analysis/SKILL.md:70 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-cloud-vulnerability-posture-management/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-cloud-vulnerability-posture-management/SKILL.md:67 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-cloud-waf-rules/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-cloud-waf-rules/SKILL.md:188 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-data-loss-prevention-with-microsoft-purview/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-data-loss-prevention-with-microsoft-purview/SKILL.md:437 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-disk-encryption-with-bitlocker/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-disk-encryption-with-bitlocker/SKILL.md:2 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-gcp-binary-authorization/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-gcp-binary-authorization/SKILL.md:118 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-hashicorp-vault-dynamic-secrets/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-hashicorp-vault-dynamic-secrets/SKILL.md:112 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-image-provenance-verification-with-cosign/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-image-provenance-verification-with-cosign/SKILL.md:79 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-mtls-for-zero-trust-services/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-mtls-for-zero-trust-services/SKILL.md:64 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-network-access-control/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-network-access-control/SKILL.md:63 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-patch-management-workflow/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-patch-management-workflow/SKILL.md:103 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-rapid7-insightvm-for-scanning/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-rapid7-insightvm-for-scanning/SKILL.md:181 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-secret-scanning-with-gitleaks/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-secret-scanning-with-gitleaks/SKILL.md:107 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-secrets-management-with-vault/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-secrets-management-with-vault/SKILL.md:76 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-supply-chain-security-with-in-toto/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-supply-chain-security-with-in-toto/SKILL.md:152 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-velociraptor-for-ir-collection/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-velociraptor-for-ir-collection/SKILL.md:262 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-zero-standing-privilege-with-cyberark/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-zero-standing-privilege-with-cyberark/SKILL.md:117 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/implementing-zero-trust-with-hashicorp-boundary/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/implementing-zero-trust-with-hashicorp-boundary/SKILL.md:150 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/managing-cloud-identity-with-okta/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/managing-cloud-identity-with-okta/SKILL.md:108 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-active-directory-bloodhound-analysis/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-active-directory-bloodhound-analysis/SKILL.md:243 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-agentless-vulnerability-scanning/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-agentless-vulnerability-scanning/SKILL.md:123 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-api-fuzzing-with-restler/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-api-fuzzing-with-restler/SKILL.md:161 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-automated-malware-analysis-with-cape/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-automated-malware-analysis-with-cape/SKILL.md:71 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-aws-privilege-escalation-assessment/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-aws-privilege-escalation-assessment/SKILL.md:78 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-brand-monitoring-for-impersonation/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-brand-monitoring-for-impersonation/SKILL.md:115 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-cloud-asset-inventory-with-cartography/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-cloud-asset-inventory-with-cartography/SKILL.md:252 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-cloud-incident-containment-procedures/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-cloud-incident-containment-procedures/SKILL.md:95 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-cloud-native-threat-hunting-with-aws-detective/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-cloud-native-threat-hunting-with-aws-detective/SKILL.md:70 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-cloud-storage-forensic-acquisition/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-cloud-storage-forensic-acquisition/SKILL.md:188 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-csrf-attack-simulation/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-csrf-attack-simulation/SKILL.md:118 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-deception-technology-deployment/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-deception-technology-deployment/SKILL.md:181 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-disk-forensics-investigation/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-disk-forensics-investigation/SKILL.md:2 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-http-parameter-pollution-attack/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-http-parameter-pollution-attack/SKILL.md:100 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-jwt-none-algorithm-attack/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-jwt-none-algorithm-attack/SKILL.md:85 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-kubernetes-etcd-security-assessment/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-kubernetes-etcd-security-assessment/SKILL.md:93 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-log-source-onboarding-in-siem/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-log-source-onboarding-in-siem/SKILL.md:171 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-malware-persistence-investigation/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-malware-persistence-investigation/SKILL.md:132 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-oauth-scope-minimization-review/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-oauth-scope-minimization-review/SKILL.md:106 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-paste-site-monitoring-for-credentials/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-paste-site-monitoring-for-credentials/SKILL.md:271 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-service-account-credential-rotation/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-service-account-credential-rotation/SKILL.md:179 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/performing-sqlite-database-forensics/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/performing-sqlite-database-forensics/SKILL.md:298 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/prioritizing-vulnerabilities-with-cvss-scoring/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/prioritizing-vulnerabilities-with-cvss-scoring/SKILL.md:192 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/remediating-s3-bucket-misconfiguration/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/remediating-s3-bucket-misconfiguration/SKILL.md:135 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/reverse-engineering-dotnet-malware-with-dnspy/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/reverse-engineering-dotnet-malware-with-dnspy/SKILL.md:169 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/reverse-engineering-ios-app-with-frida/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/reverse-engineering-ios-app-with-frida/SKILL.md:150 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/securing-api-gateway-with-aws-waf/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/securing-api-gateway-with-aws-waf/SKILL.md:320 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/securing-aws-iam-permissions/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/securing-aws-iam-permissions/SKILL.md:112 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/securing-aws-lambda-execution-roles/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/securing-aws-lambda-execution-roles/SKILL.md:99 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/securing-azure-with-microsoft-defender/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/securing-azure-with-microsoft-defender/SKILL.md:103 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/securing-container-registry-with-harbor/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/securing-container-registry-with-harbor/SKILL.md:213 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/securing-helm-chart-deployments/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/securing-helm-chart-deployments/SKILL.md:191 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/securing-kubernetes-on-cloud/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/securing-kubernetes-on-cloud/SKILL.md:125 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: skills/securing-serverless-functions/SKILL.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

skills/securing-serverless-functions/SKILL.md:82 SecretsSkill file

high System graph security Semgrep conf 1.00 disabled cert validation — skills/building-red-team-c2-infrastructure-with-havoc/scripts/agent.py:26