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SametKUM/klustr

https://github.com/SametKUM/klustr · scanned 2026-06-16 00:01 UTC (2 months, 3 weeks ago)

60 raw signals (0 security + 60 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 3 weeks ago · v1 · 56 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 4 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 56 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 10 Low 6 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 56 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 26 Security 3 Cicd 4 Quality 23

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 68.8/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 2405 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 60 findings — concentrated in frontend (26), quality (23), cicd (8). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 12 medium. Recommended next step: open the frontend layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 16 of 56 actionable findings. 60 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — frontend/src/features/_shared/providerIcons.tsx:44

Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/settings.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/settings.json VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

golangci/golangci-lint-action@v9 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

2 files, 3 locations

.github/workflows/release.yml:114, 359 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/ci.yml:49

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/release.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/pages.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in frontend/src/features/_shared/providerIcons.tsx:44

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

frontend/src/features/_shared/providerIcons.tsx:44 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in site/src/main.ts:67

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

site/src/main.ts:67 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 64 placeholder/mock markers across 25 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/deploy-pages@v5 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

2 files, 3 locations

.github/workflows/release.yml:62, 192 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/pages.yml:49

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio

39 tests / 387 src (ratio 0.10).

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: frontend/src/features/_shared/ResourceDetailPanel.tsx (1146 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: frontend/src/lib/api.ts (1248 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: frontend/src/lib/wails/wailsjs/go/models.ts (7616 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

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