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citrolabs/ego-lite

https://github.com/citrolabs/ego-lite · scanned 2026-07-23 19:36 UTC (1 month, 2 weeks ago)

17 raw signals (0 security + 17 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 2 weeks ago · v3 · last Δ +1.9 (diff) · 17 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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70.0% cov · 17 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 2 Medium 11 Low 3 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 17 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 4 Security 8 Network 2 Cicd 3

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

Scan summary Repository scanned at 57.4/100 with 70.0% coverage. It contains 748 nodes across 1 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 17 findings — concentrated in security (8), quality (4), cicd (3). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 2 high, 11 medium. Recommended next step: open the security layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 16 of 17 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security security conf 0.90 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in package/ego-browser/scripts/mutation-check.mjs:20

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

package/ego-browser/scripts/mutation-check.mjs:20 Node child process

high System graph security Skillspector conf 0.95 SkillSpector TM1 (tool-misuse) in skills/ego-browser/scripts/install.sh

rm -rf "$TEMP_DIR" >/dev/ Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns). Skill: ego-browser Rule: TM1 Category: tool-misuse Severity: HIGH Confidence: 0.95 Remediation:…

skills/ego-browser/scripts/install.sh:65 Mcp skillTool misuseTm1

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: AGENTS.md

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

AGENTS.md VerificationAgents md

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/ci.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in package/ego-browser/scripts/real-browser-e2e/fixture.mjs:26

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

package/ego-browser/scripts/real-browser-e2e/fixture.mjs:26 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 28 placeholder/mock markers across 10 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph network Security conf 1.00 Privileged port 16 in use

Port 16 is privileged (<1024). Make sure the service runs with the right caps or front it with a non-privileged port via a load balancer.

skills/ego-browser/scripts/install.sh Ports

medium System graph network Security conf 1.00 Privileged port 17 in use

Port 17 is privileged (<1024). Make sure the service runs with the right caps or front it with a non-privileged port via a load balancer.

skills/ego-browser/scripts/install.sh Ports

medium System graph security Skillspector conf 0.70 SkillSpector E1 (data-exfil) in skills/ego-browser/scripts/install.sh

curl require_command hdiutil # Download and mount the DMG in an isolated temp directory to avoid polluting the CWD. temp_base_dir=${TMPDIR:-/tmp} temp_base_dir=${temp_base_dir%/} TEMP_DIR=$(mkte Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. M…

skills/ego-browser/scripts/install.sh:148 Mcp skillData exfilE1

medium System graph security Skillspector conf 0.70 SkillSpector LP3 (mcp-least-priv) in skills/ego-browser/SKILL.md

MCP Least Privilege Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated. Skill: ego-browser Rule: LP3 Category: mcp-least-priv Severity: MEDIUM Confidence: 0.70 Remediation: Add a 'permissions' field to SKILL.md listing the capabilities this skill requires.

skills/ego-browser/SKILL.md:1 Mcp skillMcp least privLp3

medium System graph security Skillspector conf 0.70 SkillSpector PE2 (priv-esc) in skills/ego-browser/scripts/install.sh

sudo Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified. Skill: ego-browser Rule: PE2 Category: priv-esc Severity: MEDIUM Confidence: 0.70 Remediation: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed…

skills/ego-browser/scripts/install.sh:42 Mcp skillPriv escPe2

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 105 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/quality-gates.yml:29 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 package.json defines install-time lifecycle scripts

preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare scripts execute during dependency installation. Review them carefully for network calls, obfuscation, shell execution, or credential access.

package/ego-browser/package.json CI/CD securitySupply chainNpm

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