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dotnet/aspnetcore

https://github.com/dotnet/aspnetcore.git · scanned 2026-05-16 12:51 UTC (1 day, 8 hours ago) · 10 languages

396 findings (15 legacy + 381 scanner) 2/10 scanners ran Scanner says 76 (higher by 12)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 day, 10 hours ago · v3 · 132 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
{# ── 2026-05-17 R27 #5: score breakdown panel ────────────────────── Surfaces the score_breakdown JSON that's been silently stored on Repository for months. Turns hidden math into a trust signal. #}
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: source: legacy × excluding tests × Reset all
Scan summary Repository scanned at 76.1/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 15739 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 127 findings — concentrated in software (50), quality (38), frontend (22). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 26 medium. Recommended next step: open the software layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 5 of 132 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy software xxe conf 1.00 [SEC027] XML External Entity (XXE) — Node.js xml parsers: Node.js XML parsers can expand external entities if not configured. libxmljs in particular has had XXE CVEs.
Pass `noent: false` to libxmljs. Avoid xml2js or pass explicit secure config. Prefer parsers that don't expand external entities at all.
src/Components/Web.JS/src/Services/NavigationEnhancement.ts:311 xxelegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
src/Components/QuickGrid/Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.QuickGrid/src/Pagination/Paginator.razor.cs:42 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
src/Components/QuickGrid/Microsoft.AspNetCore.Components.QuickGrid/src/QuickGrid.razor.cs:320 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
src/Middleware/Spa/SpaProxy/src/SpaProxyLaunchManager.cs:106 ssrflegacy
medium Legacy security path_traversal conf 1.00 [SEC012] ZipSlip — Archive Path Traversal: Archive extraction without path validation allows writing files outside the target directory.
Validate extracted paths with os.path.realpath() and ensure they stay within the target directory.
eng/common/cross/install-debs.py:271 path_traversallegacy
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
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