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raelli/aelli

https://github.com/raelli/aelli · scanned 2026-06-15 23:45 UTC (2 months, 4 weeks ago)

27 raw signals (0 security + 27 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 4 weeks ago · v1 · 27 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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100.0% cov · 27 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 10 Low 14 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 27 Crowd 0 Layer: Hardware 3 Frontend 1 Security 2 Cicd 2 Quality 12 Api 7

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 61.7/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 405 nodes across 7 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 27 findings — concentrated in quality (12), api (7), hardware (3). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 10 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 24 of 27 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/llm/client.js:66

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/memory/client.js:8

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/skills/engineering/qdrant-client.js:7

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/workflow-runs/client.js:154

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/settings.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/settings.json VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, ci. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile

No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.

Container

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/cli/ask.js:2

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/cli/ask.js:2 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/skills/octowiz/bundle-builder.js:4

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/skills/octowiz/bundle-builder.js:4 Node child process

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected

No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.

CI/CD securityCoverage

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 19 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example

Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `AELLI_ADVISOR_MODEL`, `AELLI_LLM_ADVICE`, `AELLI_SERVER_URL`, `AELLI_VALIDATOR_PRINCIPAL`, `CODING_MODEL_HIGH`, `CODING_MODEL_MAX`, `CODING_MODEL_NORMAL`, `CODING_MODEL_XHIGH` + 11 more. Add them (with a placeholder/comment) to .env.example so onb…

config drift

low System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap

Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found

Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.

Deployment

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: node:18-alpine

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

Dockerfile:1 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 package.json defines install-time lifecycle scripts

preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare scripts execute during dependency installation. Review them carefully for network calls, obfuscation, shell execution, or credential access.

package.json CI/CD securitySupply chainNpm

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /a2a/task-queue

`index.js` declares `GET /a2a/task-queue` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /memory/:key(*)

`src/memory/service.js` declares `GET /memory/:key(*)` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /

`src/webhooks/github.js` declares `POST /` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /a2a/task-queue/:id/claim

`index.js` declares `POST /a2a/task-queue/:id/claim` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /a2a/task-queue/:id/result

`index.js` declares `POST /a2a/task-queue/:id/result` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: PUT /memory/:key(*)

`src/memory/service.js` declares `PUT /memory/:key(*)` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: USE /webhooks/github

`index.js` declares `USE /webhooks/github` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

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