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zzasqas/ArkRecodetools

https://github.com/zzasqas/ArkRecodetools · scanned 2026-06-16 01:14 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

25 raw signals (0 security + 25 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 25 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Combined
68.3
/100
Security checks
68
0 findings
System graph
68
77.8% cov · 25 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 11 Low 10 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 25 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 3 Security 6 Cicd 1 Quality 12 Api 3
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 68.3/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 57 nodes across 3 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 25 findings — concentrated in quality (12), security (6), frontend (3). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 11 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 22 of 25 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: tier-list/CLAUDE.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
tier-list/CLAUDE.md:133 SecretsClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: tier-list/CLAUDE.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
tier-list/CLAUDE.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, tests, operator-readme, lockfile. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected
A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.
CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening
medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, tests, operator-readme, lockfile. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/compress-char-art.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in equip-optimizer.html:2822
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
equip-optimizer.html:2822 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in assets/header.js:18
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
assets/header.js:18 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in equip-optimizer.html:2538
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
equip-optimizer.html:2538 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in index.html:524
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
index.html:524 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 9 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 5 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality dependencies conf 1.00 Node manifest has dependencies but no lockfile: server/package.json
`package.json` declares dependencies, but no same-directory npm/pnpm/yarn/bun lockfile was found. Generated projects without lockfiles are less reproducible and harder to secure-scan precisely.
server/package.json LockfileReproducibilityGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Docs conf 1.00 README lacks setup or run instructions
A README exists, but it does not contain common install/setup/run markers. This matches a frequent generated-code pattern: UI is present, operational handoff is thin.
ReadmeRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — arkrecode-equip-capture.user.js:45
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — server/server.js:36
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /
`server/server.js` declares `GET /` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /admin/download
`server/server.js` declares `GET /admin/download` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /submit
`server/server.js` declares `POST /submit` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
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