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langgenius/dify

https://github.com/langgenius/dify · scanned 2026-06-05 04:47 UTC (11 hours, 31 minutes ago) · 10 languages

1882 findings (126 legacy + 1756 scanner) 11/13 scanners ran 54th percentile · Python · medium (20-100K LoC) Scanner says 77 (lower by 15)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 11 hours, 30 minutes ago · v2 · 1004 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5
Component Sub-score Weight Contribution
structure_score 60.0 0.15 9.00
security_score 100.0 0.25 25.00
testing_score 0.0 0.20 0.00
documentation_score 79.0 0.15 11.85
practices_score 68.0 0.15 10.20
code_quality 65.0 0.10 6.50
Overall 1.00 62.5
security_score may be inflated — optional security scanners were skipped on this fast scan
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Top 10 actions, ranked by impact × ease. Severity drives impact; tag-based fix-clarity drives ease.

#1
Possible secret in docker/volumes/opensearch/opensearch_dashboards.yml
GapSeverity.CRITICAL Layer.SECURITY score 1.000
Why: critical severity · a leaked credential is a worst-case bug · fix is short / mechanical
Fix: Rotate the credential and remove it from in docker/volumes/opensearch/opensearch_dashboards.yml:214; move to env var / secrets manager.
docker/volumes/opensearch/opensearch_dashboards.yml:214
#2
Possible secret in api/controllers/console/wraps.py
GapSeverity.CRITICAL Layer.SECURITY score 1.000
Why: critical severity · a leaked credential is a worst-case bug · fix is short / mechanical
Fix: Rotate the credential and remove it from in api/controllers/console/wraps.py:32; move to env var / secrets manager.
api/controllers/console/wraps.py:32
#3
Possible secret in web/app/components/base/markdown-blocks/form.tsx
GapSeverity.CRITICAL Layer.SECURITY score 1.000
Why: critical severity · a leaked credential is a worst-case bug · fix is short / mechanical
Fix: Rotate the credential and remove it from in web/app/components/base/markdown-blocks/form.tsx:29; move to env var / secrets manager.
web/app/components/base/markdown-blocks/form.tsx:29
#4
FastAPI POST `create_run` without auth dependency — dify-agent/src/dify_agent/server/routes/runs.py:45
GapSeverity.HIGH Layer.SECURITY score 0.537
Why: high severity · OWASP-class risk
Fix: Add `user = Depends(get_current_user)` to the function signature in dify-agent/src/dify_agent/server/routes/runs.py:45.
dify-agent/src/dify_agent/server/routes/runs.py:45
#5
FastAPI POST `cancel_run` without auth dependency — dify-agent/src/dify_agent/server/routes/runs.py:70
GapSeverity.HIGH Layer.SECURITY score 0.537
Why: high severity · OWASP-class risk
Fix: Add `user = Depends(get_current_user)` to the function signature in dify-agent/src/dify_agent/server/routes/runs.py:70.
dify-agent/src/dify_agent/server/routes/runs.py:70
#6
Flask mutation route `trigger_endpoint` without `@login_required` — api/controllers/trigger/trigger.py:17
GapSeverity.HIGH Layer.SECURITY score 0.525
Why: high severity · OWASP-class risk
Fix: Add `@login_required` decorator above the route function in api/controllers/trigger/trigger.py:17.
api/controllers/trigger/trigger.py:17
#7
Flask mutation route `handle_webhook` without `@login_required` — api/controllers/trigger/webhook.py:43
GapSeverity.HIGH Layer.SECURITY score 0.525
Why: high severity · OWASP-class risk
Fix: Add `@login_required` decorator above the route function in api/controllers/trigger/webhook.py:43.
api/controllers/trigger/webhook.py:43
#8
Flask mutation route `handle_webhook_debug` without `@login_required` — api/controllers/trigger/webhook.py:72
GapSeverity.HIGH Layer.SECURITY score 0.525
Why: high severity · OWASP-class risk
Fix: Add `@login_required` decorator above the route function in api/controllers/trigger/webhook.py:72.
api/controllers/trigger/webhook.py:72
#9
Flask mutation route `approve_external` without `@login_required` — api/controllers/openapi/oauth_device_sso.py:214
GapSeverity.HIGH Layer.SECURITY score 0.525
Why: high severity · OWASP-class risk
Fix: Add `@login_required` decorator above the route function in api/controllers/openapi/oauth_device_sso.py:214.
api/controllers/openapi/oauth_device_sso.py:214
#10
Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in api/core/trigger/debug/event_bus.py:68
GapSeverity.HIGH Layer.SECURITY score 0.413
Why: high severity · OWASP-class risk
api/core/trigger/debug/event_bus.py:68

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