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tombaldwin/candor-ts

https://github.com/tombaldwin/candor-ts · scanned 2026-06-16 00:39 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

31 raw signals (0 security + 31 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 31 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
56.7
/100
Security checks
57
0 findings
System graph
57
88.9% cov · 31 findings
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 3 Medium 11 Low 7 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 31 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 1 Security 7 Cicd 1 Quality 17 Api 5
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 56.7/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 317 nodes across 2 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 31 findings — concentrated in quality (17), security (7), api (5). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 3 high, 11 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 19 of 31 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET http://h/ (fabrication_probe.mjs:113)
`fabrication_probe.mjs:113` calls `GET http://h/` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: helper:request Normalized path used for matching: `/http:/h` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.
Dangling fetchHelper:request
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET http://h/ (test.mjs:687)
`test.mjs:687` calls `GET http://h/` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: helper:request Normalized path used for matching: `/http:/h` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.
Dangling fetchHelper:request
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET https://h/ (fabrication_probe.mjs:134)
`fabrication_probe.mjs:134` calls `GET https://h/` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: helper:request Normalized path used for matching: `/https:/h` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.
Dangling fetchHelper:request
medium System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction contains unpinned remote install: AGENTS.md
Remote install commands in agent instructions are a supply-chain risk, especially when an agent can execute shell commands.
AGENTS.md:8 Supply chainAgents md
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, tests, lockfile. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected
A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.
CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening
medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, tests, lockfile. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/publish.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in Cases.ts:5
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
Cases.ts:5 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in fabrication_probe.mjs:36
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
fabrication_probe.mjs:36 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in fuzz.mjs:14
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
fuzz.mjs:14 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in watch.mjs:17
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
watch.mjs:17 Node child process
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 26 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality dependencies conf 1.00 Node manifest has dependencies but no lockfile: package.json
`package.json` declares dependencies, but no same-directory npm/pnpm/yarn/bun lockfile was found. Generated projects without lockfiles are less reproducible and harder to secure-scan precisely.
package.json LockfileReproducibilityGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /pure
`test.mjs` declares `GET /pure` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /x
`test.mjs` declares `GET /x` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: scan.mjs (1163 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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