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zdods/blackhaul

https://github.com/zdods/blackhaul · scanned 2026-06-16 01:11 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

18 raw signals (0 security + 18 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 18 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 18 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 1 High 1 Medium 7 Low 5 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 18 Crowd 0 Layer: Hardware 4 Frontend 1 Security 5 Cicd 2 Quality 6

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 62.6/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 202 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 18 findings — concentrated in quality (6), security (5), hardware (4). Risk profile is high: 1 critical, 1 high, 7 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 12 of 18 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: CLAUDE.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

CLAUDE.md:85 SecretsClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — web/src/lib/auth.js:26

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/release.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/pages.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in bastion/main.go:166

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

bastion/main.go:166 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in site/index.html:932

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

site/index.html:932 Direct innerhtml assignment

low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found

Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.

Deployment

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: alpine:3.24

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

bastion/Dockerfile:25 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: golang:1.26-alpine

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

bastion/Dockerfile:14 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: node:22-alpine

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

bastion/Dockerfile:6 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

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