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vivekdse/breezefile

https://github.com/vivekdse/breezefile · scanned 2026-06-16 00:52 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

130 raw signals (0 security + 130 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 130 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
49.0
/100
Security checks
49
0 findings
System graph
49
77.8% cov · 130 findings
Critical
1
click to filter
Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 1 High 0 Medium 24 Low 18 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 130 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 6 Security 16 Cicd 3 Quality 105
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 49.0/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 1335 nodes across 1 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 130 findings — concentrated in quality (105), security (16), frontend (6). Risk profile is high: 1 critical, 0 high, 24 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 43 of 130 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in electron/typebuild/auth.ts
Detected pattern matching generic_api_key. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
electron/typebuild/auth.ts:34
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — electron/sources/typebuild.ts:349
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/settings.json
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/settings.json VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
softprops/action-gh-release@v2 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/release.yml:64 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/release.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/components/FileRow.tsx:338
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
src/components/FileRow.tsx:338 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in tmp/design/01-spotlight.html:507
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
tmp/design/01-spotlight.html:507 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in tmp/design/02-ghost-text.html:387
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
tmp/design/02-ghost-text.html:387 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in tmp/design/03-sentence-chips.html:504
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
tmp/design/03-sentence-chips.html:504 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in tmp/design/04-predictive-grid.html:635
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
tmp/design/04-predictive-grid.html:635 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in tmp/design/05-cascading-columns.html:447
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
tmp/design/05-cascading-columns.html:447 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in electron/agents/claude.ts:20
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
electron/agents/claude.ts:20 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in electron/ipc.ts:5
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
electron/ipc.ts:5 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in electron/platform/linux.ts:1
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
electron/platform/linux.ts:1 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in electron/platform/mac.ts:1
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
electron/platform/mac.ts:1 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in electron/remoteDaemon.ts:16
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
electron/remoteDaemon.ts:16 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in electron/remoteHooks.ts:15
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
electron/remoteHooks.ts:15 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in electron/remoteRoute.ts:10
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
electron/remoteRoute.ts:10 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in electron/typebuild/detect.ts:8
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
electron/typebuild/detect.ts:8 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in package.json:10
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
package.json:10 Node child process
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 37 placeholder/mock markers across 13 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Runtime service client appears to use placeholder configuration
A runtime source file appears to wire Supabase/Firebase/AI/payment-style clients to placeholder URLs, keys, or fallback values. In the Fable corpus this often means the UI/API shape is present while the backend service is not actually configured.
Runtime configService clientGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
5 test file(s) for 131 source file(s) (ratio 0.04). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 16 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Multiple root agent instruction files without precedence
The repo has multiple top-level AI-coder instruction files. Without precedence rules, different agents may follow different policies.
Governance
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `history__copy` in src/components/RunHistoryDialog.tsx:157
Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.
old markerDead code
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `view__copy` in src/components/RunsView.tsx:167
Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.
old markerDead code
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 package.json defines install-time lifecycle scripts
preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare scripts execute during dependency installation. Review them carefully for network calls, obfuscation, shell execution, or credential access.
package.json CI/CD securitySupply chainNpm
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — daemon/breezed.ts:61
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — electron/api-server.ts:201
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — electron/ipc.ts:590
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — electron/main.ts:136
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — electron/remoteDaemon.ts:84
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — electron/scheduler.ts:60
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: electron/ipc.ts (2327 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: electron/sources/typebuild.ts (1336 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/App.tsx (1665 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/components/ChipPrompt.tsx (3594 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/components/TaskComposer.tsx (1791 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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