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Pixelle-Video

https://github.com/AIDC-AI/Pixelle-Video.git · scanned 2026-05-17 02:45 UTC (15 hours, 37 minutes ago) · 10 languages

216 findings (49 legacy + 167 scanner) 56th percentile · Python · medium (20-100K LoC) Scanner says 72 (lower by 18)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 15 hours, 37 minutes ago · v1 · 216 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
67.1
/100
Repobility
62
49 legacy
9-layer
72
100.0% cov · 167 gaps
Critical
0
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Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: medium × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 19 Medium 26 Low 78 Source: Legacy 49 9-layer 167 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 30 Security 24 Quality 125 Cicd 14 Hardware 3 Frontend 1 Api 19
Scan summary Repository scanned at 72.4/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 776 nodes across 21 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 167 findings — concentrated in quality (107), software (21), api (19). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 10 high, 8 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 26 of 216 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium Legacy security auth conf 0.92 [AUC001] No Repobility access matrix policy found: The repository uses web/API frameworks but does not define .repobility/access.yml or equivalent authorization documentation.
The repository uses web/API frameworks but does not define .repobility/access.yml or equivalent authorization documentation.
authlegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.74 [AUC002] Low visible authorization coverage in route inventory: Only 4.8% of discovered routes show nearby authentication, authorization, middleware, or public-route evidence.
Only 4.8% of discovered routes show nearby authentication, authorization, middleware, or public-route evidence.
authlegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.68 [AUC009] Sensitive function route lacks elevated authorization evidence: A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: DELETE /{task_id}.
A route appears to perform a sensitive function such as export, invite, role, token, billing, or destructive action without elevated policy evidence. Endpoint: DELETE /{task_id}.
api/routers/tasks.py:78 authlegacy
medium Legacy security auth conf 0.72 [AUC012] FastAPI interactive docs may be exposed by framework defaults: FastAPI exposes /docs, /redoc, and /openapi.json by default. Public production APIs should explicitly disable those defaults, protect them behind admin authentication, or publish a reviewed OpenAPI spec with declared security requirements.
FastAPI exposes /docs, /redoc, and /openapi.json by default. Public production APIs should explicitly disable those defaults, protect them behind admin authentication, or publish a reviewed OpenAPI spec with declared security requirements.
authlegacy
medium Legacy security path_traversal conf 1.00 [SEC012] ZipSlip — Archive Path Traversal: Archive extraction without path validation allows writing files outside the target directory.
Validate extracted paths with os.path.realpath() and ensure they stay within the target directory.
packaging/windows/build.py:275 path_traversallegacy
medium Legacy security crypto conf 1.00 [SEC014] SSL Verification Disabled: SSL certificate verification is disabled, allowing man-in-the-middle attacks.
Enable SSL verification. Use verify=True (default) for requests. Pin certificates if needed.
packaging/windows/build.py:126 cryptolegacy
medium Legacy security llm_injection conf 0.80 [SEC017] Unbounded Input to LLM/External API: User input is passed to an LLM or external AI API (OpenAI, Anthropic, etc.) without any visible length or size validation. This creates two risks: (1) Cost abuse — an attacker can send extremely long inputs to burn through your API credits (a single 128K-token request to GPT-4 costs ~$4, and automated attacks can drain budgets in minutes). (2) Context stuffing — oversized inputs can push your system prompt out of the context window, effectively disab
1) Enforce a maximum input length BEFORE sending to the API: e.g. `if len(text) > 4000: return error`. 2) Use token counting (tiktoken for OpenAI, anthropic's token counter) to enforce token-level limits. 3) Set max_tokens on the API call to cap response cost. 4) Add rate limiting per user/IP to pr…
pixelle_video/pipelines/custom.py:488 llm_injectionlegacy
medium Legacy software log_injection conf 1.00 [SEC034] Log Injection / Log Forging — unsanitized user input in log: User input is logged without sanitizing newlines or control characters. Attackers inject `\n` to forge fake log entries, hide tracks, or exploit downstream log parsers (SIEM, splunk). Combined with template injection this can escalate to RCE (CVE-2021-44228 log4shell). CWE-117.
Strip control characters before logging: safe = user_input.replace('\n','').replace('\r','').replace('\x00','') logger.info('User action: %s', safe) Always use parameterized logging (`%s` + args), never f-strings or string concat — that's also what mitigates log4shell-style attacks. For structu…
api/routers/image.py:44 log_injectionlegacy
medium Legacy software log_injection conf 1.00 [SEC034] Log Injection / Log Forging — unsanitized user input in log: User input is logged without sanitizing newlines or control characters. Attackers inject `\n` to forge fake log entries, hide tracks, or exploit downstream log parsers (SIEM, splunk). Combined with template injection this can escalate to RCE (CVE-2021-44228 log4shell). CWE-117.
Strip control characters before logging: safe = user_input.replace('\n','').replace('\r','').replace('\x00','') logger.info('User action: %s', safe) Always use parameterized logging (`%s` + args), never f-strings or string concat — that's also what mitigates log4shell-style attacks. For structu…
api/routers/frame.py:57 log_injectionlegacy
medium Legacy software log_injection conf 1.00 [SEC034] Log Injection / Log Forging — unsanitized user input in log: User input is logged without sanitizing newlines or control characters. Attackers inject `\n` to forge fake log entries, hide tracks, or exploit downstream log parsers (SIEM, splunk). Combined with template injection this can escalate to RCE (CVE-2021-44228 log4shell). CWE-117.
Strip control characters before logging: safe = user_input.replace('\n','').replace('\r','').replace('\x00','') logger.info('User action: %s', safe) Always use parameterized logging (`%s` + args), never f-strings or string concat — that's also what mitigates log4shell-style attacks. For structu…
api/routers/content.py:58 log_injectionlegacy
medium Legacy quality quality conf 0.72 Agent control bridge may listen on a network interface without visible auth
Agent, MCP, sidecar, and command bridge servers often start as local helpers. Binding them to 0.0.0.0 or a default all-interface listener without an authorization guard can expose tool execution or session data to the LAN.
docker-compose.yml:35 qualitylegacy
medium Legacy cicd docker conf 0.94 Compose service `init` image uses the latest tag
The latest tag is mutable and can change without a code review, producing different images from the same source.
docker-compose.yml:14 dockerlegacy
medium Legacy cicd docker conf 0.82 Docker final stage has no non-root USER
Docker images run as root unless the image or Dockerfile switches to a non-root user.
Dockerfile:4 dockerlegacy
medium Legacy quality quality conf 0.70 Public web app has no Content Security Policy
A Content Security Policy reduces the blast radius of injected scripts if the app is ever served through preview, static hosting, or a web container outside its normal sandbox.
index.html qualitylegacy
medium Legacy quality quality conf 0.78 Public web service has no security.txt
security.txt gives researchers and customers a safe disclosure channel. Public web apps and APIs should publish it under /.well-known/security.txt.
.well-known/security.txt qualitylegacy
medium Legacy software dependency conf 0.70 Remote install command pipes network code directly to a shell
Agent helper projects often publish one-line installers. `curl | sh` style commands are convenient, but they bypass review unless the script is pinned, signed, or checksum-verified.
docs/zh/getting-started/installation.md:59 dependencylegacy
medium Legacy software dependency conf 0.70 Remote install command pipes network code directly to a shell
Agent helper projects often publish one-line installers. `curl | sh` style commands are convenient, but they bypass review unless the script is pinned, signed, or checksum-verified.
docs/zh/faq.md:12 dependencylegacy
medium Legacy software dependency conf 0.70 Remote install command pipes network code directly to a shell
Agent helper projects often publish one-line installers. `curl | sh` style commands are convenient, but they bypass review unless the script is pinned, signed, or checksum-verified.
docs/en/faq.md:12 dependencylegacy
medium 9-layer hardware security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
securitycontainer
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/docs.yml supply-chaingithub-actionsleast-privilege
medium 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in api/config.py:31
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
api/config.py:31 owaspcors_wildcard
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — packaging/windows/build.py:349
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — pixelle_video/pipelines/asset_based.py:630
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — pixelle_video/services/video.py:238
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer security coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). Either auth lives in custom code, in a separate service, or is missing.
coverageauth
medium 9-layer quality tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 100 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
testscoverage
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