WordPress/WordPress-Develop

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https://github.com/WordPress/WordPress-Develop.git · scanned 2026-05-16 13:30 UTC (1 day, 6 hours ago) · 10 languages

121 findings (29 legacy + 92 scanner) 8/10 scanners ran Scanner says 70 (lower by 12)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 day, 10 hours ago · v1 · 112 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

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{# ── 2026-05-17 R27 #5: score breakdown panel ────────────────────── Surfaces the score_breakdown JSON that's been silently stored on Repository for months. Turns hidden math into a trust signal. #}

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: severity: high × excluding tests × Reset all

Scan summary Repository scanned at 69.9/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 5577 nodes across 4 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 92 findings — concentrated in software (50), quality (24), frontend (11). Risk profile is high: 2 critical, 0 high, 15 medium. Recommended next step: open the software layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 4 of 112 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy software xxe conf 1.00 [SEC027] XML External Entity (XXE) — Node.js xml parsers: Node.js XML parsers can expand external entities if not configured. libxmljs in particular has had XXE CVEs.

Pass `noent: false` to libxmljs. Avoid xml2js or pass explicit secure config. Prefer parsers that don't expand external entities at all.

src/js/_enqueues/wp/sanitize.js:30 xxelegacy

high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.

Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…

src/wp-admin/edit-form-comment.php:186 ssrflegacy

src/wp-admin/about.php:180 ssrflegacy

src/wp-activate.php:128 ssrflegacy

{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}

For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.

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