Public scan — anyone with this URL can view this analysis. Sign up to track your own repos privately, run scheduled re-scans, and get AI fix prompts via your dashboard.
90 of your 113 findings came from Repobility's proprietary detections. ✓ Repobility tags below mark them.

Scan timing: clone 3.18s · analysis 1.88s · 2.9 MB · GitHub preflight 467ms

imakris/sintra

https://github.com/imakris/sintra.git · scanned 2026-05-19 20:32 UTC (2 weeks, 2 days ago) · 10 languages

215 findings (113 legacy + 102 scanner) Scanner says 88 (lower by 11)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 weeks, 2 days ago · v2 · 164 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5
Component Sub-score Weight Contribution
structure_score 55.0 0.15 8.25
security_score 95.0 0.25 23.75
testing_score 85.0 0.20 17.00
documentation_score 90.0 0.15 13.50
practices_score 70.0 0.15 10.50
code_quality 37.4 0.10 3.74
Overall 1.00 76.7
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Corpus Intelligence Cross-corpus context (cohort percentile, top patterns, fix plan) is shown only on repositories you own. Sign up and connect your repo to view it.
Scan summary Repository scanned at 87.9/100 with 66.7% coverage. It contains 574 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 51 findings — concentrated in cicd (40), quality (4), software (3). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 18 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 51 of 164 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Workflow uses `secrets.CODECOV_TOKEN` on a `pull_request` trigger
This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.CODECOV_TOKEN }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted cont…
.github/workflows/coverage.yml:148 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Workflow uses `secrets.GIST_SECRET` on a `pull_request` trigger
This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.GIST_SECRET }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted contex…
.github/workflows/build-windows.yml:196 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Workflow uses `secrets.GIST_SECRET` on a `pull_request` trigger
This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.GIST_SECRET }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted contex…
.github/workflows/build-windows.yml:182 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Workflow uses `secrets.GIST_SECRET` on a `pull_request` trigger
This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.GIST_SECRET }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted contex…
.github/workflows/build-linux.yml:184 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Workflow uses `secrets.GIST_SECRET` on a `pull_request` trigger
This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.GIST_SECRET }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted contex…
.github/workflows/build-linux.yml:170 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Workflow uses `secrets.GIST_SECRET` on a `pull_request` trigger
This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.GIST_SECRET }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted contex…
.github/workflows/build-macos.yml:136 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Workflow uses `secrets.GIST_SECRET` on a `pull_request` trigger
This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.GIST_SECRET }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted contex…
.github/workflows/build-macos.yml:122 dependencylegacy
high Legacy quality quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED034] Python Subprocess Shell True: subprocess(..., shell=True) enables command injection.
Review and fix per the pattern semantics. See CWE-78 / for context.
trigger_ci.py:22 qualitylegacy
high Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Action `actions/cache` pinned to mutable ref `@v4`
`uses: actions/cache@v4` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lock with Dependabot or renovate.
.github/workflows/build-linux.yml:101 dependencylegacy
high Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4`
`uses: actions/checkout@v4` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lock with Dependabot or renovate.
.github/workflows/build-windows.yml:38 dependencylegacy
high Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4`
`uses: actions/checkout@v4` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lock with Dependabot or renovate.
.github/workflows/build-linux.yml:38 dependencylegacy
high Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4`
`uses: actions/checkout@v4` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lock with Dependabot or renovate.
.github/workflows/coverage.yml:25 dependencylegacy
high Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4`
`uses: actions/checkout@v4` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lock with Dependabot or renovate.
.github/workflows/build-macos.yml:38 dependencylegacy
high Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Action `actions/upload-artifact` pinned to mutable ref `@v4`
`uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lock with Dependabot or renovate.
.github/workflows/build-windows.yml:172 dependencylegacy
high Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Action `actions/upload-artifact` pinned to mutable ref `@v4`
`uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lock with Dependabot or renovate.
.github/workflows/build-linux.yml:160 dependencylegacy
high Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Action `actions/upload-artifact` pinned to mutable ref `@v4`
`uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lock with Dependabot or renovate.
.github/workflows/coverage.yml:156 dependencylegacy
high Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Action `actions/upload-artifact` pinned to mutable ref `@v4`
`uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lock with Dependabot or renovate.
.github/workflows/build-macos.yml:112 dependencylegacy
high Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Action `codecov/codecov-action` pinned to mutable ref `@v5`
`uses: codecov/codecov-action@v5` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lock with Dependabot or renovate.
.github/workflows/coverage.yml:146 dependencylegacy
high Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Action `dorny/paths-filter` pinned to mutable ref `@v3`
`uses: dorny/paths-filter@v3` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lock with Dependabot or renovate.
.github/workflows/build-windows.yml:44 dependencylegacy
high Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Action `dorny/paths-filter` pinned to mutable ref `@v3`
`uses: dorny/paths-filter@v3` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lock with Dependabot or renovate.
.github/workflows/build-linux.yml:44 dependencylegacy
high Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Action `dorny/paths-filter` pinned to mutable ref `@v3`
`uses: dorny/paths-filter@v3` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lock with Dependabot or renovate.
.github/workflows/build-macos.yml:44 dependencylegacy
high Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Action `schneegans/dynamic-badges-action` pinned to mutable ref `@v1.7.0`
`uses: schneegans/[email protected]` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lock with Dependabot or renovate.
.github/workflows/build-windows.yml:180 dependencylegacy
high Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Action `schneegans/dynamic-badges-action` pinned to mutable ref `@v1.7.0`
`uses: schneegans/[email protected]` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lock with Dependabot or renovate.
.github/workflows/build-linux.yml:168 dependencylegacy
high Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Action `schneegans/dynamic-badges-action` pinned to mutable ref `@v1.7.0`
`uses: schneegans/[email protected]` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lock with Dependabot or renovate.
.github/workflows/build-macos.yml:120 dependencylegacy
medium Legacy security injection conf 0.50 [SEC005] Command Injection Risk: Unsafe shell execution or eval of user input.
Use subprocess with shell=False and a list of args. Never eval user input.
trigger_ci.py:22 injectionlegacy
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
dorny/paths-filter@v3 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/build-macos.yml:44 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
schneegans/[email protected] can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/build-macos.yml:120 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
codecov/codecov-action@v5 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/coverage.yml:146 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
dorny/paths-filter@v3 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/build-linux.yml:44 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
schneegans/[email protected] can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/build-linux.yml:168 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
dorny/paths-filter@v3 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/build-windows.yml:44 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
schneegans/[email protected] can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/build-windows.yml:180 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/coverage.yml supply-chaingithub-actionsleast-privilege
medium 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'subprocess_shell_true' in trigger_ci.py:24
Found a known-risky pattern (subprocess_shell_true). Review and replace if possible.
trigger_ci.py:24 owaspsubprocess_shell_true
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/collect_lldb_backtraces.py:75
`subprocess.check_output(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — trigger_ci.py:77
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer security coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). Either auth lives in custom code, in a separate service, or is missing.
coverageauth
low 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/build-macos.yml:38 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
low 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/upload-artifact@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/build-macos.yml:112 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
low 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/coverage.yml:25 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
low 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/upload-artifact@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/coverage.yml:156 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
low 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/build-linux.yml:38 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
low 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/cache@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/build-linux.yml:101 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
low 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/upload-artifact@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/build-linux.yml:160 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
low 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/build-windows.yml:38 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
low 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/upload-artifact@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/build-windows.yml:172 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
low 9-layer software dead-code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: code_repl
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
scripts/build_reference_site.py:195 dead-code
low 9-layer software dead-code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: image_repl
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
scripts/build_reference_site.py:218 dead-code
low 9-layer software dead-code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: link_repl
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
scripts/build_reference_site.py:205 dead-code
low 9-layer quality complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: tests/run_tests.py (2874 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
complexity
low Legacy quality quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED064] Python Input Call: input() blocks for stdin. Inappropriate in services.
Review and fix per the pattern semantics.
trigger_ci.py:15 qualitylegacy
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
For AI agents + API integrations
Email me when this repo regresses
Free. We re-scan periodically; new criticals → your inbox. No signup required for the scan itself.
API access

This page is publicly accessible at: https://repobility.com/scan/1ae44061-342b-463b-80b3-ae74d563bd72/

To check status programmatically (no auth required):

curl -s https://repobility.com/api/v1/public/scan/1ae44061-342b-463b-80b3-ae74d563bd72/

Important — please don't re-submit the same URL repeatedly. The submission endpoint is idempotent: re-submitting the same git URL returns this same scan_token, not a new one. To re-scan this repo, sign up free and use the dashboard.