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trsdn/roadtripbingo

https://github.com/trsdn/roadtripbingo · scanned 2026-06-16 00:42 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

40 raw signals (0 security + 40 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 39 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 1 repeated signal grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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77.8% cov · 39 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 12 Low 22 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 39 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 18 Security 4 Cicd 3 Quality 14

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 64.3/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 393 nodes across 9 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 40 findings — concentrated in frontend (18), quality (14), security (4). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 12 medium. Recommended next step: open the frontend layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 34 of 39 actionable findings. 40 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/js/app.js:3049

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/js/modules/aiService.js:22

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/js/modules/serverAIService.js:39

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

anthropics/claude-code-action@beta can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/claude.yml:35 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/claude.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in server.js:152

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

server.js:152 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in src/js/app.js:135

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

src/js/app.js:135 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in src/js/app.js:3276

Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.

src/js/app.js:3276 Insert adjacent html

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 20 placeholder/mock markers across 5 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Runtime service client appears to use placeholder configuration

A runtime source file appears to wire Supabase/Firebase/AI/payment-style clients to placeholder URLs, keys, or fallback values. In the Fable corpus this often means the UI/API shape is present while the backend service is not actually configured.

Runtime configService clientGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 173 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/upload-artifact@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

2 files, 2 locations

.github/workflows/ci.yml:62

.github/workflows/claude.yml:29

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Icon-only button without accessible name — src/js/app.js:3208

A `<button>` whose only child is a single glyph or symbol needs `title=` or `aria-label=` so screen readers (and tooltips on hover) work. Why: P3 in CHECKLIST.md — icon-only buttons skipped a title. Rule id: fq.button.no-label

Fq button no label

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — config/webpack.config.js:43