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Sadiq-Teslim/watermarking-engine

https://github.com/Sadiq-Teslim/watermarking-engine · scanned 2026-06-15 23:59 UTC (2 months, 3 weeks ago)

35 raw signals (0 security + 35 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 3 weeks ago · v1 · 34 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 1 repeated signal grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
66.3
/100
Security checks
66
0 findings
System graph
66
100.0% cov · 34 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 6 Medium 4 Low 21 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 34 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 5 Hardware 3 Frontend 1 Security 7 Quality 8 Api 10
Corpus Intelligence Cross-corpus context (cohort percentile, top patterns, fix plan) is shown only on repositories you own. Sign up and connect your repo to view it.
Scan summary Repository scanned at 66.3/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 325 nodes across 12 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 35 findings — concentrated in api (10), quality (9), security (7). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 6 high, 4 medium. Recommended next step: open the api layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 31 of 34 actionable findings. 35 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `create_detect_image_job` without auth dependency — app/routes/image.py:179
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
app/routes/image.py:179 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `create_detect` without auth dependency — app/routes/detect.py:12
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
app/routes/detect.py:12 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `create_watermark_image_job` without auth dependency — app/routes/image.py:113
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
app/routes/image.py:113 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `create_watermark` without auth dependency — app/routes/watermark.py:14
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
app/routes/watermark.py:14 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `detect_image` without auth dependency — app/routes/image.py:153
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
app/routes/image.py:153 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `watermark_image` without auth dependency — app/routes/image.py:81
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
app/routes/image.py:81 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — bench/attacks.py:7
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — bench/corpus.py:20
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found
Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.
Deployment
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 19 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: python:3.11-slim
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:3 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 2 occurrences Near-duplicate function bodies in 2 places
Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: app/routes/image.py:watermark_image_job_status, app/routes/image.py:detect_image_job_status This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://jw.hn/ai-code-hygiene). Consolidate or document why they're separat…
2 occurrences
repo-level (2 hits)
duplicatesduplication
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: instagram_sim
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
bench/image_attacks.py:75
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: require_api_key
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
app/auth.py:9
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: reshare_sim
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
bench/image_attacks.py:87
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: social_sim
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
bench/image_attacks.py:69
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: twitter_sim
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
bench/image_attacks.py:79
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /
`app/main.py` declares `GET /` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /capabilities
`app/routes/image.py` declares `GET /capabilities` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /detect/jobs/{job_id}
`app/routes/image.py` declares `GET /detect/jobs/{job_id}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /jobs/{job_id}
`app/routes/watermark.py` declares `GET /jobs/{job_id}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /watermark/jobs/{job_id}
`app/routes/image.py` declares `GET /watermark/jobs/{job_id}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /detect
`app/routes/image.py` declares `POST /detect` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /detect/jobs
`app/routes/image.py` declares `POST /detect/jobs` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /video
`app/routes/watermark.py` declares `POST /video` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /watermark
`app/routes/image.py` declares `POST /watermark` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /watermark/jobs
`app/routes/image.py` declares `POST /watermark/jobs` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
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