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dockur/windows

https://github.com/dockur/windows · scanned 2026-06-05 11:33 UTC (5 days, 11 hours ago) · 10 languages

102 raw signals (32 security + 70 graph) 20th percentile · Unknown · System graph score 79 (lower by 13)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 5 days, 11 hours ago · v2 · 24 actionable findings from 2 signal sources. 43 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5
Component Sub-score Weight Contribution
structure_score 70.0 0.15 10.50
security_score 51.4 0.25 12.85
testing_score 70.0 0.20 14.00
documentation_score 60.0 0.15 9.00
practices_score 75.0 0.15 11.25
code_quality 80.0 0.10 8.00
Overall 1.00 65.6
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Scan summary Quality grade B- (66/100). Dimensions: security 51, maintainability 70. 32 findings (21 security).

Showing 21 of 24 actionable findings. 67 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical Security checks security secrets conf 0.95 3 occurrences Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations.
Gitleaks detected a committed secret or credential pattern.
lines 1509, 1512, 1522
src/define.sh:1509, 1512, 1522 (3 hits)
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility Dockerfile FROM `dockurr/windows-arm (no tag)` not pinned by digest
`FROM dockurr/windows-arm (no tag)` resolves the tag at build time. The registry CAN re-push a different image for the same tag, so every build is potentially different. Production images should pin to `image@sha256:...` for reproducibility + supply-chain integrity.
Dockerfile:34
low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 10 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v6` uses a mutable tag or branch. Pin external actions to a reviewed full commit SHA when the workflow is security-sensitive.
5 files, 10 locations
.github/workflows/build.yml:25 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/check.yml:12 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/hub.yml:17 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/links.yml:21 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/review.yml:18 (2 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions
high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
Action `ludeeus/action-shellcheck` pinned to mutable ref `@master` uses a mutable tag or branch. Pin external actions to a reviewed full commit SHA when the workflow is security-sensitive.
.github/workflows/check.yml:15 CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions
high System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action tracks a moving branch
ludeeus/action-shellcheck@master can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/check.yml:15 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.72 Compose service adds dangerous Linux capabilities
Added capabilities expand what a compromised process can do inside or against the host kernel.
compose.yml:1 CI/CD securitycontainers
high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.82 Docker final stage has no non-root USER
Docker images run as root unless the image or Dockerfile switches to a non-root user.
Dockerfile:36 CI/CD securitycontainers
medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.84 Dockerfile ADD downloads remote content
ADD can fetch remote URLs without checksum verification. This makes builds dependent on mutable network content.
Dockerfile:33 CI/CD securitycontainers
medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.86 Dockerfile separates apt update from install
Splitting apt update and install across layers can reuse stale package indexes and make builds less reliable.
Dockerfile:16 CI/CD securitycontainers
medium System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image uses a mutable or implicit tag: build-${TARGETARCH}
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:36 containersPinned dependencies
medium System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Dockerfile ADD downloads remote content without checksum
Remote build inputs can change or be replaced upstream. Use Dockerfile ADD --checksum or download with an explicit digest/signature verification step.
Dockerfile:32 containersChecksum
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 33 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
docker/metadata-action@v6 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
4 files, 33 locations
.github/workflows/build.yml:31, 46, 49, 55, 62, 75, 82, 87, +1 more (13 hits)
.github/workflows/review.yml:21, 33, 42, 50, 57, 66 (12 hits)
.github/workflows/check.yml:20, 27, 33 (6 hits)
.github/workflows/hub.yml:20 (2 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/build.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'weak_hash' in src/mido.sh:647
Found a known-risky pattern (weak_hash). Review and replace if possible.
src/mido.sh:647 Weak hash
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). Either auth lives in custom code, in a separate service, or is missing.
auth
low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.72 .dockerignore misses sensitive defaults
.dockerignore exists but does not cover common secret or VCS patterns.
.dockerignore CI/CD securitycontainers
high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.56 Compose service does not declare a runtime user
If the image does not define USER internally, this service may run as root.
compose.yml:1 CI/CD securitycontainers
high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.62 Compose service lacks no-new-privileges hardening
no-new-privileges prevents processes from gaining additional privileges through setuid binaries or file capabilities.
compose.yml:1 CI/CD securitycontainers
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: dockurr/windows-arm:${VERSION_ARG}
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:34 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/define.sh (1919 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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