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Query-farm-haybarn/haybarn-community-extensions

https://github.com/Query-farm-haybarn/haybarn-community-extensions · scanned 2026-06-15 23:43 UTC (2 months, 4 weeks ago)

29 raw signals (0 security + 29 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 4 weeks ago · v1 · 19 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 10 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 19 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 2 Medium 7 Low 6 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 19 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 2 Network 1 Frontend 1 Security 1 Cicd 4 Quality 10

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 77.2/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 668 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 29 findings — concentrated in cicd (14), quality (10), software (2). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 2 high, 13 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 15 of 19 actionable findings. 29 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in extensions/sitting_duck/description.yml:18

Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.

extensions/sitting_duck/description.yml:18 Eval used

high System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 tj-actions/changed-files is tag-pinned instead of SHA-pinned

The tj-actions/changed-files incident showed that mutable action tags can execute credential-stealing code across many repositories. Pin this action to a reviewed commit SHA.

.github/workflows/build.yml:168 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected

A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.

CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

Query-farm-haybarn/haybarn-extension-ci-tools/.github/workflows/_extension_registry_publish.yml@haybarn can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

3 files, 3 locations

.github/workflows/_extension_deploy.yml:471

.github/workflows/build.yml:189

.github/workflows/sync_from_upstream.yml:64

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 5 occurrences GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

5 files, 5 locations

.github/workflows/_extension_deploy.yml

.github/workflows/build.yml

.github/workflows/build_all.yml

.github/workflows/republish_npm.yml

.github/workflows/sync_from_upstream.yml

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/compare_with_upstream.py:117

`subprocess.check_output(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/triage.py:48

`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph network Security conf 1.00 Privileged port 10 in use

Port 10 is privileged (<1024). Make sure the service runs with the right caps or front it with a non-privileged port via a load balancer.

extensions/boilstream/description.yml Ports

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

0 test file(s) for 7 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 47 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 5 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/download-artifact@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

2 files, 5 locations

.github/workflows/_extension_deploy.yml:267, 421, 440 (3 hits)

.github/workflows/sync_from_upstream.yml:24, 30 (2 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Near-duplicate function bodies in 2 places

Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: scripts/compare_with_upstream.py:category, scripts/compare_with_upstream.py:category This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://jw.hn/ai-code-hygiene). Consolidate or document why they're separate.

duplicatesduplication

low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: upstream_present

No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.

scripts/triage_failures.py:150

low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: upstream_present

No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.

scripts/compare_with_upstream.py:166

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

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