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smlcrft/tandem-catalogs

https://github.com/smlcrft/tandem-catalogs · scanned 2026-06-16 00:16 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

37 raw signals (0 security + 37 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 37 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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66.7% cov · 37 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 15 Low 4 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 37 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 1 Frontend 1 Security 8 Cicd 1 Quality 26

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 96.7/100 with 66.7% coverage. It contains 350 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 37 findings — concentrated in quality (26), security (8), software (1). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 15 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 19 of 37 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — frames/garden_gnome/frame.ts:209

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — frames/market_weather/frame.ts:154

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — frames/weather_api/frame.ts:29

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap

Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: ci, tests, operator-readme. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in frames/community_home/public/index.html:116

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

frames/community_home/public/index.html:116 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in frames/game_ascii_runner/public/index.html:105