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Tokarzewski/GS

https://github.com/Tokarzewski/GS · scanned 2026-06-16 00:39 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

35 raw signals (0 security + 35 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 35 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Combined
67.9
/100
Security checks
68
0 findings
System graph
68
88.9% cov · 35 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 7 Medium 14 Low 11 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 35 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 2 Frontend 2 Security 8 Cicd 1 Quality 13 Api 9
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 67.9/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 179 nodes across 6 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 35 findings — concentrated in quality (13), api (9), security (8). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 7 high, 14 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 32 of 35 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET https://www.googleapis.com/drive/v3/files/${fileId}?alt=media (web/src/google.ts:116)
`web/src/google.ts:116` calls `GET https://www.googleapis.com/drive/v3/files/${fileId}?alt=media` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/https:/www.googleapis.com/drive/v3/files/<p>` If this points at an ext…
Dangling fetchFetch
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST https://www.googleapis.com/drive/v3/files (web/src/google.ts:81)
`web/src/google.ts:81` calls `POST https://www.googleapis.com/drive/v3/files` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/https:/www.googleapis.com/drive/v3/files` If this points at an external API, prefix it wit…
Dangling fetchFetch
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST https://www.googleapis.com/upload/drive/v3/files?uploadType=multipart (web/src/google.ts:105)
`web/src/google.ts:105` calls `POST https://www.googleapis.com/upload/drive/v3/files?uploadType=multipart` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/https:/www.googleapis.com/upload/drive/v3/files` If this poin…
Dangling fetchFetch
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `auth_google` without auth dependency — backend/app/main.py:65
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/app/main.py:65 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `create_scan` without auth dependency — backend/app/main.py:78
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/app/main.py:78 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `start_scan` without auth dependency — backend/app/main.py:86
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/app/main.py:86 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `worker_token` without auth dependency — backend/app/main.py:142
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/app/main.py:142 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — web/src/api.ts:16
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — web/src/google.ts:81
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci, tests, lockfile. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in backend/app/main.py:17
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
backend/app/main.py:17 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in web/src/capture.ts:9
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
web/src/capture.ts:9 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in web/src/main.ts:12
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
web/src/main.ts:12 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in web/src/viewer.ts:7
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
web/src/viewer.ts:7 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — backend/app/gs_bridge.py:28
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — gs_cli/main.py:109
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — gs_cli/runpod_client.py:38
`requests.post(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — gs_cli/runpod_ctl_client.py:34
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected
No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.
CI/CD securityCoverage
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 23 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality dependencies conf 1.00 Node manifest has dependencies but no lockfile: web/package.json
`package.json` declares dependencies, but no same-directory npm/pnpm/yarn/bun lockfile was found. Generated projects without lockfiles are less reproducible and harder to secure-scan precisely.
web/package.json LockfileReproducibilityGenerated repo pattern
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: create_client
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
gs_cli/client_factory.py:17
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: poll_until
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
gs_cli/client_base.py:31
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /scans/{scan_id}
`backend/app/main.py` declares `GET /scans/{scan_id}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /scans/{scan_id}/logs
`backend/app/main.py` declares `GET /scans/{scan_id}/logs` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /auth/google
`backend/app/main.py` declares `POST /auth/google` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /scans
`backend/app/main.py` declares `POST /scans` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /scans/{scan_id}/start
`backend/app/main.py` declares `POST /scans/{scan_id}/start` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /scans/{scan_id}/worker-token
`backend/app/main.py` declares `POST /scans/{scan_id}/worker-token` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
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