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Tushar010402/Tushar-Agrawal-Website

https://github.com/Tushar010402/Tushar-Agrawal-Website · scanned 2026-06-16 00:43 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

110 raw signals (0 security + 110 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 90 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 20 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
55.5
/100
Security checks
56
0 findings
System graph
56
100.0% cov · 90 findings
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 21 Medium 32 Low 30 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 90 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 2 Frontend 17 Security 15 Cicd 4 Quality 19 Api 33
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 55.5/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 1182 nodes across 18 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 110 findings — concentrated in api (33), quality (23), cicd (20). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 21 high, 40 medium. Recommended next step: open the api layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 83 of 90 actionable findings. 110 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: DELETE /api/blogs/${id} (lib/api.ts:111)
`lib/api.ts:111` calls `DELETE /api/blogs/${id}` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: helper:request Normalized path used for matching: `/blogs/<p>` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.
Dangling fetchHelper:request
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: DELETE /api/blogs/comments/${id} (lib/api.ts:132)
`lib/api.ts:132` calls `DELETE /api/blogs/comments/${id}` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: helper:request Normalized path used for matching: `/blogs/comments/<p>` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips…
Dangling fetchHelper:request
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET /api/blogs (lib/api.ts:49)
`lib/api.ts:49` calls `GET /api/blogs` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: helper:request Normalized path used for matching: `/blogs` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.
Dangling fetchHelper:request
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET /api/blogs/${blogId}/comments (lib/api.ts:62)
`lib/api.ts:62` calls `GET /api/blogs/${blogId}/comments` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: helper:request Normalized path used for matching: `/blogs/<p>/comments` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips…
Dangling fetchHelper:request
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET /api/blogs/${id} (lib/api.ts:118)
`lib/api.ts:118` calls `GET /api/blogs/${id}` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: helper:request Normalized path used for matching: `/blogs/<p>` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.
Dangling fetchHelper:request
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET /api/blogs/search?q=${encodedQuery} (lib/api.ts:58)
`lib/api.ts:58` calls `GET /api/blogs/search?q=${encodedQuery}` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: helper:request Normalized path used for matching: `/blogs/search` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips…
Dangling fetchHelper:request
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET /api/blogs/slug/${slug} (lib/api.ts:53)
`lib/api.ts:53` calls `GET /api/blogs/slug/${slug}` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: helper:request Normalized path used for matching: `/blogs/slug/<p>` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.
Dangling fetchHelper:request
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET /api/users/me (app/qauth/docs/api/api-client.tsx:128)
`app/qauth/docs/api/api-client.tsx:128` calls `GET /api/users/me` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/users/me` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.
Dangling fetchFetch
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET /api/waitlist (components/quantum-shield/StatsCounter.tsx:13)
`components/quantum-shield/StatsCounter.tsx:13` calls `GET /api/waitlist` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/waitlist` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.
Dangling fetchFetch
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET /wasm/quantum_shield_demo.js (app/quantum-shield/demo/demo-client.tsx:128)
`app/quantum-shield/demo/demo-client.tsx:128` calls `GET /wasm/quantum_shield_demo.js` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/wasm/quantum_shield_demo.js` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `h…
Dangling fetchFetch
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: PATCH /api/blogs/comments/${id}/approve (lib/api.ts:125)
`lib/api.ts:125` calls `PATCH /api/blogs/comments/${id}/approve` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: helper:request Normalized path used for matching: `/blogs/comments/<p>/approve` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so th…
Dangling fetchHelper:request
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST /api/blogs (lib/api.ts:95)
`lib/api.ts:95` calls `POST /api/blogs` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: helper:request Normalized path used for matching: `/blogs` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.
Dangling fetchHelper:request
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST /api/blogs/comments (lib/api.ts:66)
`lib/api.ts:66` calls `POST /api/blogs/comments` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: helper:request Normalized path used for matching: `/blogs/comments` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.
Dangling fetchHelper:request
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST /api/chat (components/ui/ai-chat-panel.tsx:148)
`components/ui/ai-chat-panel.tsx:148` calls `POST /api/chat` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/chat` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.
Dangling fetchFetch
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST /api/waitlist (components/quantum-shield/WaitlistForm.tsx:37)
`components/quantum-shield/WaitlistForm.tsx:37` calls `POST /api/waitlist` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/waitlist` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips i…
Dangling fetchFetch
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST https://api.indexnow.org/indexnow (scripts/ping-search-engines.ts:64)
`scripts/ping-search-engines.ts:64` calls `POST https://api.indexnow.org/indexnow` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/https:/api.indexnow.org/indexnow` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `…
Dangling fetchFetch
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: POST https://www.bing.com/indexnow (scripts/ping-search-engines.ts:52)
`scripts/ping-search-engines.ts:52` calls `POST https://www.bing.com/indexnow` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/https:/www.bing.com/indexnow` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://…
Dangling fetchFetch
high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: PUT /api/blogs/${id} (lib/api.ts:103)
`lib/api.ts:103` calls `PUT /api/blogs/${id}` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: helper:request Normalized path used for matching: `/blogs/<p>` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `https://` so the matcher skips it.
Dangling fetchHelper:request
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `create_comment` without auth dependency — backend/routers/blog_router.py:179
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/routers/blog_router.py:179 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action tracks a moving branch
dtolnay/rust-toolchain@master can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/qauth-ci.yml:37 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'new_function_used' in public/wasm/quantum_shield_demo.js:1519
Found a known-risky pattern (new_function_used). Review and replace if possible.
public/wasm/quantum_shield_demo.js:1519 New function used
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/about/page.tsx:126
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/blog/[slug]/blog-post-client.tsx:279
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/blog/[slug]/page.tsx:239
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/blog/page.tsx:213
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/blog/tag/[tag]/page.tsx:115
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/layout.tsx:290
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/page.tsx:163
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/privacy/page.tsx:31
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/qauth/page.tsx:47
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — app/quantum-shield/page.tsx:47
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/api/indexnow/route.ts:42
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/qauth/docs/api/api-client.tsx:128
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — public/wasm/quantum_shield_demo.js:1863
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 9 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
lines 81, 93, 107, 125, 181, 235, 289, 313, +1 more
.github/workflows/qauth-ci.yml:81, 93, 107, 125, 181, 235, 289, 313, +1 more (9 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/qauth-ci.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/about/page.tsx:126
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
app/about/page.tsx:126 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/blog/[slug]/blog-post-client.tsx:279
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
app/blog/[slug]/blog-post-client.tsx:279 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/blog/[slug]/page.tsx:239
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
app/blog/[slug]/page.tsx:239 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/blog/page.tsx:213
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
app/blog/page.tsx:213 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/blog/tag/[tag]/page.tsx:115
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
app/blog/tag/[tag]/page.tsx:115 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/layout.tsx:290
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
app/layout.tsx:290 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/page.tsx:163
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
app/page.tsx:163 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/privacy/page.tsx:31
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
app/privacy/page.tsx:31 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/qauth/page.tsx:47
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
app/qauth/page.tsx:47 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in app/quantum-shield/page.tsx:47
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
app/quantum-shield/page.tsx:47 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'local_storage_auth_token' in app/admin/page.tsx:32
Found a known-risky pattern (local_storage_auth_token). Review and replace if possible.
app/admin/page.tsx:32 Local storage auth token
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'local_storage_auth_token' in lib/api.ts:81
Found a known-risky pattern (local_storage_auth_token). Review and replace if possible.
lib/api.ts:81 Local storage auth token
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/generate-audio.mjs:25
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scripts/generate-audio.mjs:25 Node child process
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — backend/create_blogs.py:12
`requests.post(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 25 placeholder/mock markers across 9 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
15 test file(s) for 163 source file(s) (ratio 0.09). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 83 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 9 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
2 files, 9 locations
.github/workflows/qauth-ci.yml:43, 132, 154, 204, 258, 296, 332, 357 (8 hits)
.github/workflows/indexnow.yml:39
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 5 occurrences Near-duplicate function bodies in 3 places
Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: quantum-shield/qauth/sdks/python/qauth/__init__.py:validate_token, quantum-shield/qauth/sdks/python/qauth/__init__.py:validate, quantum-shield/qauth/sdks/python/qauth/__init__.py:validate This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vi…
5 occurrences
repo-level (5 hits)
duplicatesduplication
low System graph quality dependencies conf 1.00 Node manifest has dependencies but no lockfile: quantum-shield/wasm/package.json
`package.json` declares dependencies, but no same-directory npm/pnpm/yarn/bun lockfile was found. Generated projects without lockfiles are less reproducible and harder to secure-scan precisely.
quantum-shield/wasm/package.json LockfileReproducibilityGenerated repo pattern
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: is_expired
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
quantum-shield/qauth/sdks/python/qauth/__init__.py:72
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: is_not_yet_valid
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
quantum-shield/qauth/sdks/python/qauth/__init__.py:76
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — app/qauth/docs/api/api-client.tsx:88
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — app/qauth/docs/docs-client.tsx:32
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — app/qauth/docs/full-auth/full-auth-client.tsx:498
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — scripts/ping-search-engines.ts:13
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: DELETE /comments/{comment_id}
`backend/routers/blog_router.py` declares `DELETE /comments/{comment_id}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: DELETE /{blog_id}
`backend/routers/blog_router.py` declares `DELETE /{blog_id}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /
`backend/main.py` declares `GET /` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/me
`app/qauth/docs/full-auth/full-auth-client.tsx` declares `GET /api/me` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /search
`backend/routers/blog_router.py` declares `GET /search` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /slug/{slug}
`backend/routers/blog_router.py` declares `GET /slug/{slug}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /{blog_id}
`backend/routers/blog_router.py` declares `GET /{blog_id}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /{blog_id}/comments
`backend/routers/blog_router.py` declares `GET /{blog_id}/comments` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: PATCH /comments/{comment_id}/approve
`backend/routers/blog_router.py` declares `PATCH /comments/{comment_id}/approve` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes i…
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /
`backend/routers/blog_router.py` declares `POST /` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /api/auth/logout
`app/qauth/docs/full-auth/full-auth-client.tsx` declares `POST /api/auth/logout` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes i…
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /auth/signup
`app/qauth/docs/full-auth/full-auth-client.tsx` declares `POST /auth/signup` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /comments
`backend/routers/blog_router.py` declares `POST /comments` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /login
`backend/routers/auth_router.py` declares `POST /login` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: PUT /{blog_id}
`backend/routers/blog_router.py` declares `PUT /{blog_id}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: app/qauth/qauth-client.tsx (1040 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: app/quantum-shield/quantum-shield-client.tsx (1001 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: public/wasm/quantum_shield_demo.js (1871 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: quantum-shield/wasm/src/lib.rs (1400 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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