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Scan timing: clone 28.8s · analysis 12.39s · 28.5 MB · GitHub API rate-limit (preflight)

bytedance/deer-flow

https://github.com/bytedance/deer-flow · scanned 2026-06-05 08:31 UTC (5 days, 20 hours ago) · 10 languages

964 raw signals (266 security + 698 graph) 11/13 scanners ran 68th percentile · Python · large (100-500K LoC) System graph score 51 (higher by 30)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 5 days, 20 hours ago · v2 · 421 actionable findings from 2 signal sources. 193 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
62.4
/100
Security checks
74
119 findings
System graph
51
100.0% cov · 302 findings
Critical
4
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5
Component Sub-score Weight Contribution
structure_score 40.0 0.15 6.00
security_score 100.0 0.25 25.00
testing_score 100.0 0.20 20.00
documentation_score 100.0 0.15 15.00
practices_score 65.0 0.15 9.75
code_quality 57.0 0.10 5.70
Overall 1.00 81.5
security_score may be inflated — optional security scanners were skipped on this fast scan
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 4 High 89 Medium 32 Low 178 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 119 System graph 302 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 197 Security 63 Cicd 9 Software 76 Frontend 13 Hardware 6 Api 57

Top 10 actions, ranked by impact × ease. Severity drives impact; tag-based fix-clarity drives ease.

#1
Possible secret in frontend/src/core/i18n/locales/en-US.ts
GapSeverity.CRITICAL Layer.SECURITY score 1.000
Why: critical severity · a leaked credential is a worst-case bug · fix is short / mechanical
Fix: Rotate the credential and remove it from in frontend/src/core/i18n/locales/en-US.ts:488; move to env var / secrets manager.
frontend/src/core/i18n/locales/en-US.ts:488
#2
Possible secret in frontend/src/core/i18n/locales/en-US.ts
GapSeverity.CRITICAL Layer.SECURITY score 1.000
Why: critical severity · a leaked credential is a worst-case bug · fix is short / mechanical
Fix: Rotate the credential and remove it from in frontend/src/core/i18n/locales/en-US.ts:489; move to env var / secrets manager.
frontend/src/core/i18n/locales/en-US.ts:489
#3
Possible secret in frontend/src/core/i18n/locales/en-US.ts
GapSeverity.CRITICAL Layer.SECURITY score 1.000
Why: critical severity · a leaked credential is a worst-case bug · fix is short / mechanical
Fix: Rotate the credential and remove it from in frontend/src/core/i18n/locales/en-US.ts:490; move to env var / secrets manager.
frontend/src/core/i18n/locales/en-US.ts:490
#4
Possible secret in frontend/src/core/i18n/locales/en-US.ts
GapSeverity.CRITICAL Layer.SECURITY score 1.000
Why: critical severity · a leaked credential is a worst-case bug · fix is short / mechanical
Fix: Rotate the credential and remove it from in frontend/src/core/i18n/locales/en-US.ts:496; move to env var / secrets manager.
frontend/src/core/i18n/locales/en-US.ts:496
#5
FastAPI POST `create_sandbox` without auth dependency — docker/provisioner/app.py:433
GapSeverity.HIGH Layer.SECURITY score 0.537
Why: high severity · OWASP-class risk
Fix: Add `user = Depends(get_current_user)` to the function signature in docker/provisioner/app.py:433.
docker/provisioner/app.py:433
#6
FastAPI DELETE `destroy_sandbox` without auth dependency — docker/provisioner/app.py:505
GapSeverity.HIGH Layer.SECURITY score 0.537
Why: high severity · OWASP-class risk
Fix: Add `user = Depends(get_current_user)` to the function signature in docker/provisioner/app.py:505.
docker/provisioner/app.py:505
#7
FastAPI POST `generate_suggestions` without auth dependency — backend/app/gateway/routers/suggestions.py:98
GapSeverity.HIGH Layer.SECURITY score 0.537
Why: high severity · OWASP-class risk
Fix: Add `user = Depends(get_current_user)` to the function signature in backend/app/gateway/routers/suggestions.py:98.
backend/app/gateway/routers/suggestions.py:98
#8
FastAPI POST `stateless_stream` without auth dependency — backend/app/gateway/routers/runs.py:35
GapSeverity.HIGH Layer.SECURITY score 0.537
Why: high severity · OWASP-class risk
Fix: Add `user = Depends(get_current_user)` to the function signature in backend/app/gateway/routers/runs.py:35.
backend/app/gateway/routers/runs.py:35
#9
FastAPI POST `stateless_wait` without auth dependency — backend/app/gateway/routers/runs.py:60
GapSeverity.HIGH Layer.SECURITY score 0.537
Why: high severity · OWASP-class risk
Fix: Add `user = Depends(get_current_user)` to the function signature in backend/app/gateway/routers/runs.py:60.
backend/app/gateway/routers/runs.py:60
#10
FastAPI POST `install_skill` without auth dependency — backend/app/gateway/routers/skills.py:103
GapSeverity.HIGH Layer.SECURITY score 0.537
Why: high severity · OWASP-class risk
Fix: Add `user = Depends(get_current_user)` to the function signature in backend/app/gateway/routers/skills.py:103.
backend/app/gateway/routers/skills.py:103

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