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cerase-ai/cerase-acp

https://github.com/cerase-ai/cerase-acp · scanned 2026-06-17 01:46 UTC (1 month, 1 week ago)

53 raw signals (0 security + 53 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 1 week ago · v2 · last Δ +6.1 (diff) · 48 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 5 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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77.8% cov · 48 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 13 Low 4 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 48 Crowd 0 Layer: Hardware 2 Security 5 Cicd 3 Quality 38

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 82.8/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 235 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 53 findings — concentrated in quality (38), cicd (8), security (5). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 16 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 15 of 48 actionable findings. 53 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/bridge.test.ts:78

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/discord-adapter.ts:126

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/inbound-attachments.ts:37

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/internal-server.test.ts:40

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 4 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

docker/setup-buildx-action@v3 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

lines 47, 51, 59, 84

.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml:47, 51, 59, 84 (4 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/session-manager.ts:1

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/session-manager.ts:1 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in src/workspace-files.ts:10

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

src/workspace-files.ts:10 Node child process

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 22 placeholder/mock markers across 4 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: node:22

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

Dockerfile:23 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: node:22-slim

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

Dockerfile:35 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

2 files, 3 locations

.github/workflows/ci.yml:21, 24 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml:44

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `aOld` in src/bridge-auto-reload.test.ts:226

Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.

old markerDead code

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