sendscott-del/tidings — Repobility public scan

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sendscott-del/tidings

https://github.com/sendscott-del/tidings · scanned 2026-06-16 00:07 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

61 raw signals (0 security + 61 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 49 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 12 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Security checks

77.8% cov · 49 findings

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Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 2 High 0 Medium 19 Low 5 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 49 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 7 Security 8 Cicd 1 Quality 33

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 67.9/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 519 nodes across 29 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 61 findings — concentrated in quality (44), security (9), frontend (7). Risk profile is high: 3 critical, 0 high, 30 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 26 of 49 actionable findings. 61 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 2 occurrences Possible secret in .claude/skills/stake-suite-design/ui_kits/magnify/index.html

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

lines 379, 400

.claude/skills/stake-suite-design/ui_kits/magnify/index.html:379, 400 (2 hits)

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in src/pages/Login.tsx

Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.

src/pages/Login.tsx:11

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/pages/Compose.tsx:240

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/pages/InviteAccept.tsx:75

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — supabase/functions/dispatch-scheduled-messages/index.ts:227

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — supabase/functions/gather-send-invite-sms/index.ts:75

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — supabase/functions/refresh-twilio-rates/index.ts:58

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — supabase/functions/send-message/index.ts:347

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — supabase/functions/sync-roles-to-shared/index.ts:89

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, ci. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 12 occurrences Frontend route `/reset-password` has no Link/navigate to it — src/App.tsx

The route is registered but no `<Link to=…>` or `navigate(…)` in the codebase navigates here. Either it's reachable only via direct URL (intentional), it's dead, or the link broke during a refactor.

12 occurrences

repo-level (12 hits)

Orphan pageWiring

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in supabase/functions/dispatch-scheduled-messages/index.ts:4

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

supabase/functions/dispatch-scheduled-messages/index.ts:4 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in supabase/functions/gather-send-invite-sms/index.ts:19

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

supabase/functions/gather-send-invite-sms/index.ts:19 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in supabase/functions/import-contacts/index.ts:4

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

supabase/functions/import-contacts/index.ts:4 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in supabase/functions/invite-create/index.ts:3

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

supabase/functions/invite-create/index.ts:3 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in supabase/functions/refresh-twilio-rates/index.ts:16

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

supabase/functions/refresh-twilio-rates/index.ts:16 Cors wildcard

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in supabase/functions/send-message/index.ts:4

Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.

supabase/functions/send-message/index.ts:4 Cors wildcard

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected

No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.

CI/CD securityCoverage

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 41 placeholder/mock markers across 12 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

0 test file(s) for 59 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

low System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap

Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `tidings_push_banner_dismissed_v1` in src/components/EnableNotificationsBanner.tsx:5

Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.

old markerDead code

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/pages/Compose.tsx (1275 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

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