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Volksverpetzer/vvp_app

https://github.com/Volksverpetzer/vvp_app · scanned 2026-06-16 00:52 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

34 raw signals (0 security + 34 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 19 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 15 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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100.0% cov · 19 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 9 Low 6 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 19 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 3 Security 1 Cicd 4 Quality 9 Api 2

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 66.4/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 1085 nodes across 20 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 34 findings — concentrated in cicd (19), quality (9), frontend (3). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 13 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 16 of 19 actionable findings. 34 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Dangling fetch: GET https://publish.x.com/oembed?url=${search} (src/hooks/useAISearch.ts:56)

`src/hooks/useAISearch.ts:56` calls `GET https://publish.x.com/oembed?url=${search}` but no backend route matches that path. This is a runtime 404 waiting to happen. Tool: fetch Normalized path used for matching: `/https:/publish.x.com/oembed` If this points at an external API, prefix it with `htt…

Dangling fetchFetch

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — __tests__/helpers/Networking.test.ts:11

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — jest-setup.ts:107

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/settings.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/settings.json VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 5 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

ashutoshgngwr/validate-fastlane-supply-metadata@v2 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

4 files, 5 locations

.github/workflows/check-test-and-lint.yml:27, 30 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/expo-preview.yml:26

.github/workflows/expo-release-beta.yml:73

.github/workflows/expo-release.yml:72

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/update-license.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/prepare-licenses.js:4

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

scripts/prepare-licenses.js:4 Node child process

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 26 placeholder/mock markers across 13 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Runtime service client appears to use placeholder configuration

A runtime source file appears to wire Supabase/Firebase/AI/payment-style clients to placeholder URLs, keys, or fallback values. In the Fable corpus this often means the UI/API shape is present while the backend service is not actually configured.

Runtime configService clientGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 5 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 12 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v6 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

6 files, 12 locations

.github/workflows/expo-release-beta.yml:17, 34, 54 (3 hits)

.github/workflows/expo-release-mimikama.yml:13, 32, 80 (3 hits)

.github/workflows/expo-release.yml:16, 33, 53 (3 hits)

.github/workflows/check-test-and-lint.yml:13

.github/workflows/expo-preview.yml:13

.github/workflows/update-license.yml:19

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 package.json defines install-time lifecycle scripts

preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare scripts execute during dependency installation. Review them carefully for network calls, obfuscation, shell execution, or credential access.

package.json CI/CD securitySupply chainNpm

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — scripts/prepare-licenses.js:57

Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak

Fq console leak

low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /register

`src/helpers/network/ServerAPI.ts` declares `POST /register` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.

Unused endpoint

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