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usetrmnl/trmnl-home-assistant

https://github.com/usetrmnl/trmnl-home-assistant · scanned 2026-06-16 00:46 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

58 raw signals (0 security + 58 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 35 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 23 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 35 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 14 Low 13 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 35 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 6 Hardware 5 Security 6 Cicd 3 Quality 15

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 42.8/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 479 nodes across 8 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 58 findings — concentrated in cicd (26), quality (15), frontend (6). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 33 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 27 of 35 actionable findings. 58 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — trmnl-ha/ha-trmnl/html/js/api-client.ts:4

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — trmnl-ha/ha-trmnl/lib/scheduler/byos-auth.ts:113

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — trmnl-ha/ha-trmnl/lib/scheduler/webhook-delivery.ts:135

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: trmnl-ha/Dockerfile

No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.

Container

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 17 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

docker/setup-qemu-action@v3 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

4 files, 17 locations

.github/workflows/ci.yml:21, 47, 128, 131, 135, 145 (6 hits)

.github/workflows/cache-warm.yml:33, 36, 39, 46, 62 (5 hits)

.github/workflows/release.yml:34, 37, 40, 55, 66 (5 hits)

.github/workflows/claude.yml:34

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 4 occurrences GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

4 files, 4 locations

.github/workflows/cache-warm.yml

.github/workflows/ci.yml

.github/workflows/claude.yml

.github/workflows/release.yml

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in trmnl-ha/ha-trmnl/html/js/app.ts:191

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

trmnl-ha/ha-trmnl/html/js/app.ts:191 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in trmnl-ha/ha-trmnl/html/js/device-presets.ts:213

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

trmnl-ha/ha-trmnl/html/js/device-presets.ts:213 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in trmnl-ha/ha-trmnl/html/js/ui-renderer.ts:40

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

trmnl-ha/ha-trmnl/html/js/ui-renderer.ts:40 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in trmnl-ha/ha-trmnl/html/js/confirm-modal.ts:182

Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.

trmnl-ha/ha-trmnl/html/js/confirm-modal.ts:182 Insert adjacent html

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'local_storage_auth_token' in trmnl-ha/ha-trmnl/html/js/preview-generator.ts:42

Found a known-risky pattern (local_storage_auth_token). Review and replace if possible.

trmnl-ha/ha-trmnl/html/js/preview-generator.ts:42 Local storage auth token

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/release.js:9

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

scripts/release.js:9 Node child process

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 33 placeholder/mock markers across 7 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found

Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.

Deployment

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 43 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: debian:bookworm-slim

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

trmnl-ha/Dockerfile:39 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: dpokidov/imagemagick:7.1.1-47-bookworm

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

trmnl-ha/Dockerfile:13 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: oven/bun:1.3.5-slim

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

trmnl-ha/Dockerfile:22 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 5 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/github-script@v7 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

4 files, 5 locations

.github/workflows/ci.yml:26, 52 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/cache-cleanup.yml:15

.github/workflows/cache-warm.yml:67

.github/workflows/claude.yml:28

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — scripts/release.js:58