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n0-computer/iroh

https://github.com/n0-computer/iroh · scanned 2026-06-18 20:02 UTC (1 month, 1 week ago) · 10 languages

138 raw signals (47 security + 91 graph) 11/13 scanners ran 68th percentile · Rust · medium (20-100K LoC)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 1 week ago · v1 · 32 actionable findings from 2 signal sources. 106 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5
Component Sub-score Weight Contribution
structure_score 75.0 0.15 11.25
security_score 100.0 0.25 25.00
testing_score 33.0 0.20 6.60
documentation_score 70.0 0.15 10.50
practices_score 65.0 0.15 9.75
code_quality 70.0 0.10 7.00
Overall 1.00 70.1
security_score may be inflated — optional security scanners were skipped on this fast scan
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Scan summary Repository scanned at 72.2/100 with 66.7% coverage. It contains 372 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 91 findings — concentrated in cicd (71), quality (14), hardware (4). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 48 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 26 of 32 actionable findings. 138 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 5 occurrences [MINED117] Workflow declares `permissions: write-all`: The job's GITHUB_TOKEN gets EVERY permission scope. If the workflow is ever compromised (mutable action, fork PR, injected step), the attacker can push to main, publish packages, alter releases. Use least-privilege by listing only the scopes the job actually needs.
Replace with a scoped block: `permissions:\n contents: read\n issues: write` (only the scopes you need).
4 files, 5 locations
.github/workflows/netsim.yml:39, 53 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/ci.yml:522
.github/workflows/docs.yaml:20
.github/workflows/netsim_runner.yaml:101
medium Security checks quality Practices conf 1.00 [CFG006] Missing .gitignore: No .gitignore file. Risk of committing secrets and build artifacts.
Add a .gitignore appropriate for your language/framework.
medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 50 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
[MINED115] Action `n0-computer/discord-webhook-notify` pinned to mutable ref `@v1`: `uses: n0-computer/discord-webhook-notify@v1` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect many rep…
11 files, 50 locations
.github/workflows/ci.yml:65, 82, 121, 132, 136, 185, 245, 262, +4 more (24 hits)
.github/workflows/netsim_runner.yaml:113, 116, 253, 262, 284 (5 hits)
.github/workflows/docker.yaml:52, 55, 97, 107 (4 hits)
.github/workflows/docs.yaml:37, 47, 55, 67 (4 hits)
.github/workflows/tests.yaml:114, 119, 266, 368 (4 hits)
.github/workflows/beta.yaml:35 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/flaky.yaml:93 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/wine.yaml:47, 55 (2 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 2 occurrences Docker base image uses a mutable or implicit tag: alpine:latest
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
lines 30, 49
docker/Dockerfile:30, 49 (2 hits)
containersPinned dependencies
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: docker/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 5 occurrences GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
5 files, 5 locations
.github/workflows/ci.yml
.github/workflows/cleanup.yaml
.github/workflows/docs.yaml
.github/workflows/netsim.yml
.github/workflows/netsim_runner.yaml
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in iroh-relay/src/server.rs:1036
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
iroh-relay/src/server.rs:1036 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 16 placeholder/mock markers across 8 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
low Security checks quality Quality conf 0.60 4 occurrences Duplicated implementation block across source files
Duplicate implementation blocks are maintenance debt. Keep them visible, but they are not a high-severity defect unless the duplicated logic is security-sensitive or drifting.
4 files, 4 locations
iroh-relay/src/server/clients.rs:192
iroh-relay/src/server/streams.rs:151
iroh/bench/src/noq.rs:98
iroh/src/socket/transports/relay.rs:63
duplicationquality
low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 40 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
[MINED115] Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v6`: `uses: actions/checkout@v6` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect many repos. Treat official first-party actio…
8 files, 40 locations
.github/workflows/ci.yml:60, 75, 110, 126, 240, 255, 279, 282, +1 more (17 hits)
.github/workflows/release.yml:69, 75, 154, 160, 217, 315, 324 (7 hits)
.github/workflows/tests.yaml:104, 170, 220, 233, 304, 357 (6 hits)
.github/workflows/netsim_runner.yaml:107, 194, 232 (3 hits)
.github/workflows/cleanup.yaml:26 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/docker.yaml:49, 67 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/flaky.yaml:62 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/patchbay.yml:54
CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions
low Security checks quality Quality conf 0.74 robots.txt does not advertise a sitemap
Add `Sitemap: https://your-domain.example/sitemap.xml` to robots.txt.
iroh-relay/src/server.rs
low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.35 ✓ Repobility 3 occurrences Workflow references repository secrets in a pull_request workflow
Fork pull_request runs do not receive normal repository secrets on GitHub Actions. Review this as a reliability/intent signal, not as direct fork-secret exfiltration. Raise severity only for pull_request_target or another trusted-context path that runs untrusted PR code with secrets.
3 files, 3 locations
.github/workflows/ci.yml:29
.github/workflows/flaky.yaml:99
.github/workflows/wine.yaml:24
CI/CD securityworkflow secretsGitHub Actions
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: rust:alpine
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
docker/Dockerfile:1 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio
14 tests / 130 src (ratio 0.11).
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: iroh-relay/src/server.rs (1641 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: iroh-relay/src/server/http_server.rs (1801 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: iroh/src/address_lookup.rs (1401 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: iroh/src/endpoint.rs (4036 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: iroh/src/endpoint/connection.rs (1593 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: iroh/src/socket.rs (2871 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: iroh/src/socket/remote_map/remote_state.rs (1530 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: iroh/src/socket/transports/relay/actor.rs (1787 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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