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recursivlabs/minds

https://github.com/recursivlabs/minds · scanned 2026-06-15 23:48 UTC (2 months, 3 weeks ago)

55 raw signals (0 security + 55 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 3 weeks ago · v1 · 55 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
75.2
/100
Security checks
75
0 findings
System graph
75
88.9% cov · 55 findings
Critical
5
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 5 High 0 Medium 14 Low 10 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 55 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 4 Security 7 Quality 42 Api 2
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 75.2/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 732 nodes across 2 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 55 findings — concentrated in quality (42), security (7), frontend (4). Risk profile is high: 5 critical, 0 high, 14 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 29 of 55 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in scripts/chat-e2e.mjs
Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
scripts/chat-e2e.mjs:31
critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in scripts/diag-inbox.mjs
Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
scripts/diag-inbox.mjs:21
critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in scripts/diag-post-autojoin.mjs
Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
scripts/diag-post-autojoin.mjs:17
critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in scripts/verify-parity.mjs
Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
scripts/verify-parity.mjs:18
critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in scripts/verify-realtime.mjs
Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
scripts/verify-realtime.mjs:33
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — components/ChatBubble.tsx:58
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — components/PostCard.tsx:318
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
Fq dangerous html
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/(tabs)/admin.tsx:411
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/(tabs)/create.tsx:272
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/(tabs)/user/[username].tsx:667
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/hooks.ts:377
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/moderation.ts:11
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/subscription.ts:21
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/video.ts:126
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in components/ChatBubble.tsx:58
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
components/ChatBubble.tsx:58 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in components/PostCard.tsx:318
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
components/PostCard.tsx:318 Dangerous innerhtml
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 78 placeholder/mock markers across 27 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
9 test file(s) for 114 source file(s) (ratio 0.08). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 7 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example
Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `EXPO_PUBLIC_API_URL`, `EXPO_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_HOST`, `EXPO_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_KEY`, `EXPO_PUBLIC_RECURSIV_PROJECT_ID`, `EXPO_PUBLIC_SITE_URL`, `QA_EMAIL`, `QA_PASSWORD`. Add them (with a placeholder/comment) to .env.example so onboarding doesn't break.
config drift
low System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, operator-readme. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 28 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Docs conf 1.00 No README detected
No README file was found. Generated repos without README context are hard to operate, validate, or safely hand off.
ReadmeRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — app/(tabs)/jobs.tsx:90
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /signals/batch
`lib/signals.ts` declares `POST /signals/batch` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /signals/post
`lib/signals.ts` declares `POST /signals/post` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: app/(tabs)/chat.tsx (1208 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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