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tonyv2289/floridanomics-dashboard-mvp

https://github.com/tonyv2289/floridanomics-dashboard-mvp · scanned 2026-06-16 00:40 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

34 raw signals (0 security + 34 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 24 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 10 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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66.7% cov · 24 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 9 Low 13 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 24 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 5 Security 2 Cicd 3 Quality 14

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 62.1/100 with 66.7% coverage. It contains 368 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 34 findings — concentrated in quality (14), cicd (13), frontend (5). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 9 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 22 of 24 actionable findings. 34 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — scripts/federal-data.ts:194

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — scripts/lib/benchmarks.ts:37

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — scripts/lib/sources.ts:38

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/launch.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/launch.json VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/refresh-data.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/generate-memo.ts:13

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

scripts/generate-memo.ts:13 Node child process

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 12 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 11 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v6 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

4 files, 11 locations

.github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml:22, 25, 50, 55, 68 (5 hits)

.github/workflows/ci.yml:13, 16 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/refresh-data.yml:22, 25 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/security.yml:16, 19 (2 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio

7 tests / 40 src (ratio 0.17).

low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected

No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `api_signature_v2` in scripts/federal-data.ts:51

Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.

old markerDead code

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — scripts/generate-memo.ts:47