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smabe/end-of-line

https://github.com/smabe/end-of-line · scanned 2026-06-16 00:16 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

79 raw signals (0 security + 79 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 70 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 9 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
88.7
/100
Security checks
89
0 findings
System graph
89
88.9% cov · 70 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: medium × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 15 Low 31 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 70 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 20 Frontend 1 Security 6 Cicd 1 Quality 42
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 88.7/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 4184 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 79 findings — concentrated in quality (51), software (20), security (6). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 15 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 15 of 70 actionable findings. 79 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: end_of_line/skills/clu-reply/SKILL.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
end_of_line/skills/clu-reply/SKILL.md VerificationSkill file
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, ci. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in end_of_line/web/index.html:323
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
end_of_line/web/index.html:323 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in plans/archive/clu-top-tui/brainstorm/prototype.html:253
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
plans/archive/clu-top-tui/brainstorm/prototype.html:253 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'subprocess_shell_true' in end_of_line/cli.py:6124
Found a known-risky pattern (subprocess_shell_true). Review and replace if possible.
end_of_line/cli.py:6124 Subprocess shell true
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'subprocess_shell_true' in end_of_line/dispatch.py:440
Found a known-risky pattern (subprocess_shell_true). Review and replace if possible.
end_of_line/dispatch.py:440 Subprocess shell true
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'subprocess_shell_true' in end_of_line/dry_merge.py:96
Found a known-risky pattern (subprocess_shell_true). Review and replace if possible.
end_of_line/dry_merge.py:96 Subprocess shell true
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — end_of_line/cli.py:1519
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — end_of_line/cross_plan_rules.py:283
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — end_of_line/dispatch.py:617
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — end_of_line/dry_merge.py:64
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — end_of_line/notify_imessage_inbound.py:115
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected
No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.
CI/CD securityCoverage
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