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SKRYRSH/Weebji-os

https://github.com/SKRYRSH/Weebji-os · scanned 2026-06-16 00:15 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

42 raw signals (0 security + 42 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 42 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
46.0
/100
Security checks
46
0 findings
System graph
46
55.6% cov · 42 findings
Critical
2
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 2 High 0 Medium 31 Low 7 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 42 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 3 Security 21 Cicd 1 Quality 17
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 46.0/100 with 55.6% coverage. It contains 134 nodes across 1 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 42 findings — concentrated in security (21), quality (17), frontend (3). Risk profile is high: 2 critical, 0 high, 31 medium. Recommended next step: open the security layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 40 of 42 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'private_key_in_repo' in supabase/functions/refresh-play-subscriptions/index.ts:26
Found a known-risky pattern (private_key_in_repo). Review and replace if possible.
supabase/functions/refresh-play-subscriptions/index.ts:26 Private key in repo
critical System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'private_key_in_repo' in supabase/functions/verify-play-purchase/index.ts:35
Found a known-risky pattern (private_key_in_repo). Review and replace if possible.
supabase/functions/verify-play-purchase/index.ts:35 Private key in repo
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — supabase/functions/brevo-event-email/index.ts:204
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — supabase/functions/brevo-sequence/index.ts:162
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — supabase/functions/brevo-signup/index.ts:162
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — supabase/functions/razorpay-create-order/index.ts:38
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — supabase/functions/refresh-play-subscriptions/index.ts:37
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — supabase/functions/verify-play-purchase/index.ts:48
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: CLAUDE.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
CLAUDE.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected
A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.
CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/deploy.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in supabase/functions/brevo-event-email/index.ts:4
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
supabase/functions/brevo-event-email/index.ts:4 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in supabase/functions/brevo-sequence/index.ts:4
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
supabase/functions/brevo-sequence/index.ts:4 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in supabase/functions/brevo-signup/index.ts:2
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
supabase/functions/brevo-signup/index.ts:2 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in supabase/functions/razorpay-create-order/index.ts:4
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
supabase/functions/razorpay-create-order/index.ts:4 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in supabase/functions/razorpay-verify-payment/index.ts:4
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
supabase/functions/razorpay-verify-payment/index.ts:4 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in supabase/functions/scheduled-push/index.ts:5
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
supabase/functions/scheduled-push/index.ts:5 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in supabase/functions/send-push/index.ts:5
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
supabase/functions/send-push/index.ts:5 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in supabase/functions/validate-progress/index.ts:4
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
supabase/functions/validate-progress/index.ts:4 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in supabase/functions/verify-play-purchase/index.ts:4
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
supabase/functions/verify-play-purchase/index.ts:4 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in ascend/index.html:668
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
ascend/index.html:668 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in landing/index.html:951
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
landing/index.html:951 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in weebji-os/index.html:2480
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
weebji-os/index.html:2480 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in weebji-os/public/ascend/index.html:656
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
weebji-os/public/ascend/index.html:656 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in weebji-os/public/index.html:2480
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
weebji-os/public/index.html:2480 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in weebji-os/public/landing/index.html:939
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
weebji-os/public/landing/index.html:939 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in weebji-os/index.html:3623
Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.
weebji-os/index.html:3623 Insert adjacent html
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in weebji-os/public/index.html:3623
Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.
weebji-os/public/index.html:3623 Insert adjacent html
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'local_storage_auth_token' in weebji-os/index.html:2834
Found a known-risky pattern (local_storage_auth_token). Review and replace if possible.
weebji-os/index.html:2834 Local storage auth token
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'local_storage_auth_token' in weebji-os/public/index.html:2834
Found a known-risky pattern (local_storage_auth_token). Review and replace if possible.
weebji-os/public/index.html:2834 Local storage auth token
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 19 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, tests. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 13 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `cutoffOld` in supabase/functions/scheduled-push/index.ts:112
Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.
old markerDead code
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — scripts/gen-vapid.js:36
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — weebji-os/js/app.js:11
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
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