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Open-Generative-AI

https://github.com/Anil-matcha/Open-Generative-AI.git · scanned 2026-05-17 02:55 UTC (19 hours ago) · 10 languages

102 findings (52 legacy + 50 scanner) Scanner says 80 (lower by 29)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 19 hours ago · v1 · 102 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
75.6
/100
Repobility
71
52 legacy
9-layer
81
88.9% cov · 50 gaps
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
{# ── 2026-05-17 R27 #5: score breakdown panel ────────────────────── Surfaces the score_breakdown JSON that's been silently stored on Repository for months. Turns hidden math into a trust signal. #}
Score breakdown â 2026-05-17-v4 calibration-aware
Component Sub-score Weight Contribution
structure_score 100.0 0.15 15.00
security_score 60.6 0.25 15.15
testing_score 5.0 0.20 1.00
documentation_score 38.7 0.15 5.81
practices_score 50.0 0.15 7.50
code_quality 70.0 0.10 7.00
Overall 1.00 51.5
Calibrated penalty buckets (security_score): web: 3.0 · authz: 9.7 · docker: 5.8 · threat: 10.8 · journey: 10.1
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: layer: software × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 10 Medium 29 Low 51 Source: Legacy 52 9-layer 50 Crowd 0 Layer: Security 17 Quality 45 Cicd 6 Software 9 Api 1 Frontend 21 Hardware 3
Corpus Intelligence Cross-corpus context (cohort percentile, top patterns, fix plan) is shown only on repositories you own. Sign up and connect your repo to view it.
Scan summary Repository scanned at 80.5/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 579 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 50 findings — concentrated in frontend (21), quality (17), software (6). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 11 medium. Recommended next step: open the frontend layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 9 of 102 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
app/api/app/[[...path]]/route.js:31 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
app/api/api/v1/[[...path]]/route.js:27 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
app/api/agents/[[...path]]/route.js:26 ssrflegacy
low 9-layer software dead-code-candidate conf 1.00 File has no detected symbols: electron/lib/modelCatalog.js
Source file with no class/function declarations — possible config, dead code, or scratch file.
dead-code-candidate
low 9-layer software dead-code-candidate conf 1.00 File has no detected symbols: packages/studio/postcss.config.js
Source file with no class/function declarations — possible config, dead code, or scratch file.
dead-code-candidate
low 9-layer software dead-code-candidate conf 1.00 File has no detected symbols: packages/studio/tailwind.config.js
Source file with no class/function declarations — possible config, dead code, or scratch file.
dead-code-candidate
low 9-layer software dead-code-candidate conf 1.00 File has no detected symbols: postcss.config.js
Source file with no class/function declarations — possible config, dead code, or scratch file.
dead-code-candidate
low 9-layer software dead-code-candidate conf 1.00 File has no detected symbols: src/lib/models.js
Source file with no class/function declarations — possible config, dead code, or scratch file.
dead-code-candidate
low 9-layer software dead-code-candidate conf 1.00 File has no detected symbols: tailwind.config.js
Source file with no class/function declarations — possible config, dead code, or scratch file.
dead-code-candidate
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
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