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holaboss-ai/holaOS

https://github.com/holaboss-ai/holaOS · scanned 2026-05-31 01:26 UTC (5 days, 14 hours ago) · 10 languages

915 findings (167 legacy + 748 scanner) 11/13 scanners ran 36th percentile · Typescript · large (100-500K LoC) Scanner says 67 (higher by 6)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 5 days, 14 hours ago · v2 · last Δ +4.9 (diff) · 609 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
72.3
/100
Repobility
78
167 legacy
9-layer
67
100.0% cov · 442 gaps
Critical
28
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5
Component Sub-score Weight Contribution
structure_score 60.0 0.15 9.00
security_score 100.0 0.25 25.00
testing_score 58.0 0.20 11.60
documentation_score 65.0 0.15 9.75
practices_score 70.0 0.15 10.50
code_quality 70.0 0.10 7.00
Overall 1.00 72.8
security_score may be inflated — optional security scanners were skipped on this fast scan
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: critical × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 28 High 106 Medium 51 Low 233 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Legacy 167 9-layer 442 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 278 Security 19 Cicd 48 Software 106 Frontend 101 Hardware 2 Api 55
Corpus Intelligence Cross-corpus context (cohort percentile, top patterns, fix plan) is shown only on repositories you own. Sign up and connect your repo to view it.
Scan summary Repository scanned at 66.9/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 9450 nodes across 30 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 442 findings — concentrated in quality (183), frontend (101), api (55). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 6 high, 47 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 28 of 609 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical Legacy quality quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED018] Unsafe Deserialization Pickle: pickle.loads / yaml.load (without Loader=SafeLoader) / unmarshal of network/file data — RCE.
Review and fix per the pattern semantics. See CWE-502 / A08:2021 for context.
runtime/api-server/src/composio-tool-registry.ts:48 qualitylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.APPLE_APP_SPECIFIC_PASSWORD` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.APPLE_APP_SPECIFIC_PASSWORD }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:269 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.APPLE_ID` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.APPLE_ID }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:268 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.APPLE_TEAM_ID` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.APPLE_TEAM_ID }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:270 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:751 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:663 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:601 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:752 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:664 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:602 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:750 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:662 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:600 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.HOLABOSS_RELEASES_REPO_TOKEN` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.HOLABOSS_RELEASES_REPO_TOKEN }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:943 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.HOLABOSS_RELEASES_REPO_TOKEN` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.HOLABOSS_RELEASES_REPO_TOKEN }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:222 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.MAC_CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.MAC_CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:267 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.MAC_CERTIFICATE` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.MAC_CERTIFICATE }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:266 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:1079 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.R2_ENDPOINT_URL` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.R2_ENDPOINT_URL }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:1085 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:1080 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:845 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:364 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:302 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.SENTRY_DSN` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.SENTRY_DSN }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:753 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.SENTRY_DSN` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.SENTRY_DSN }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:340 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy software dependency conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED116] Workflow uses `secrets.SENTRY_DSN` on a `pull_request` trigger: This workflow triggers on `pull_request`, which checks out the FORK's code. Referencing `${ secrets.SENTRY_DSN }` lets a PR from any fork exfiltrate the secret (modify a script, log the value, etc.). Use `pull_request_target` ONLY with strict checkout discipline (no fork code in the trusted context).
Either remove the secret reference, or switch the trigger to `pull_request_target` AND ensure no fork-controlled code runs before the secret is consumed.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:294 dependencylegacy
critical Legacy quality quality conf 1.00 [SEC079] Python: yaml.load without SafeLoader: yaml.load() without explicit SafeLoader can execute arbitrary Python objects (CVE-2017-18342). Ported from bandit B506 / dlint DUO109 (Apache-2.0 / BSD-3).
Use `yaml.safe_load(data)` or `yaml.load(data, Loader=yaml.SafeLoader)`.
runtime/api-server/src/composio-tool-registry.ts:48 qualitylegacy
critical Legacy security deserialization conf 1.00 [SEC116] Ruby YAML.load / Marshal.load on untrusted input: `YAML.load` (pre-3.1) and `Marshal.load` instantiate arbitrary Ruby classes — direct RCE on untrusted input. `unsafe_load` is even more dangerous.
Use `YAML.safe_load(input, permitted_classes: [Date])` — explicit class allowlist. Never use `Marshal.load` on untrusted data; serialize as JSON instead.
runtime/api-server/src/composio-tool-registry.ts:48 deserializationlegacy
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