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wildjack73/auboisrieur-site

https://github.com/wildjack73/auboisrieur-site · scanned 2026-06-16 00:57 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

33 raw signals (0 security + 33 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 31 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 2 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
64.2
/100
Security checks
64
0 findings
System graph
64
77.8% cov · 31 findings
Critical
1
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 1 High 0 Medium 21 Low 7 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 31 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 1 Security 12 Cicd 1 Quality 17
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 64.2/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 283 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 33 findings — concentrated in quality (17), security (12), cicd (3). Risk profile is high: 1 critical, 0 high, 21 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 29 of 31 actionable findings. 33 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in .github/workflows/scrape.yml
Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
.github/workflows/scrape.yml:142
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — adjuge-v2/build.mjs:395
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — adjuge-v2/search-page.js:81
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — patch-lot-features.mjs:31
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/settings.local.json
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/settings.local.json VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing license, tests, operator-readme. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected
A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.
CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening
medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, tests, operator-readme. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in adjuge-v2/search-page.js:24
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
adjuge-v2/search-page.js:24 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in daemon.mjs:979
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
daemon.mjs:979 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in adjuge-v2/build.mjs:405
Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.
adjuge-v2/build.mjs:405 Insert adjacent html
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in adjuge-v2/search-page.js:83
Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.
adjuge-v2/search-page.js:83 Insert adjacent html
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in daemon.mjs:3109
Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.
daemon.mjs:3109 Insert adjacent html
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'insert_adjacent_html' in patch-lot-features.mjs:41
Found a known-risky pattern (insert_adjacent_html). Review and replace if possible.
patch-lot-features.mjs:41 Insert adjacent html
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in adjuge-v2/ingest.mjs:14
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
adjuge-v2/ingest.mjs:14 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in adjuge-v2/score.mjs:12
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
adjuge-v2/score.mjs:12 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in adjuge-v2/scraper.mjs:8
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
adjuge-v2/scraper.mjs:8 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in daemon.mjs:28
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
daemon.mjs:28 Node child process
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scraper.mjs:18
Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.
scraper.mjs:18 Node child process
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Runtime service client appears to use placeholder configuration
A runtime source file appears to wire Supabase/Firebase/AI/payment-style clients to placeholder URLs, keys, or fallback values. In the Fable corpus this often means the UI/API shape is present while the backend service is not actually configured.
Runtime configService clientGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 26 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 173 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
lines 19, 22, 30
.github/workflows/scrape.yml:19, 22, 30 (3 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Docs conf 1.00 No README detected
No README file was found. Generated repos without README context are hard to operate, validate, or safely hand off.
ReadmeRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: adjuge-v2/build.mjs (1301 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: daemon.mjs (5527 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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