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welshDog/BROskiPets-LLM-dNFT

https://github.com/welshDog/BROskiPets-LLM-dNFT · scanned 2026-06-16 00:58 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

75 raw signals (0 security + 75 graph)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 71 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 4 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 47.9/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 680 nodes across 21 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 75 findings — concentrated in quality (29), api (19), security (15). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 11 high, 29 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 69 of 71 actionable findings. 75 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/eep-mint-batch/SKILL.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
.claude/skills/eep-mint-batch/SKILL.md:81 SecretsClaude instruction
high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/hypercode-hyperfocus-builder/SKILL.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
.claude/skills/hypercode-hyperfocus-builder/SKILL.md:225 SecretsClaude instruction
high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/hypercode-mcp-gateway/SKILL.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
.claude/skills/hypercode-mcp-gateway/SKILL.md:53 SecretsClaude instruction
high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/hypercode-supabase/SKILL.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
.claude/skills/hypercode-supabase/SKILL.md:38 SecretsClaude instruction
high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/technical-skills-audit/security-guide.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
.claude/skills/technical-skills-audit/security-guide.md:37 SecretsClaude instruction
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `chat_with_pet` without auth dependency — api/pet_bridge.py:343
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
api/pet_bridge.py:343 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `evolve_pet` without auth dependency — api/pet_bridge.py:404
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
api/pet_bridge.py:404 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `evolve` without auth dependency — evolve_relay.py:69
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
evolve_relay.py:69 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `feed_pet` without auth dependency — api/pet_bridge.py:288
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
api/pet_bridge.py:288 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `purchase_item` without auth dependency — api/shop.py:207
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
api/shop.py:207 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `rewards_award` without auth dependency — api/pet_bridge.py:539
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
api/pet_bridge.py:539 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/eip1559-gas/SKILL.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/eip1559-gas/SKILL.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/hyper-context-restore/evals/evals.json
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/hyper-context-restore/evals/evals.json VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/hypercode-agent-spawner/AGENT_TEAMS.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/hypercode-agent-spawner/AGENT_TEAMS.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/hypercode-docker-ops/SKILL.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/hypercode-docker-ops/SKILL.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/hypercode-frontend/SKILL.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/hypercode-frontend/SKILL.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/hypercode-hypersync/EVALS.json
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/hypercode-hypersync/EVALS.json VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/hypercode-mcp-gateway/TOOLS.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/hypercode-mcp-gateway/TOOLS.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/hypercode-redis-pubsub/SKILL.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/hypercode-redis-pubsub/SKILL.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/hypercode-self-improver/EVAL_EXAMPLES.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/hypercode-self-improver/EVAL_EXAMPLES.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/taste-skill/SKILL.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/taste-skill/SKILL.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/technical-skills-audit/data-architecture.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/technical-skills-audit/data-architecture.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/technical-skills-audit/observability-guide.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/technical-skills-audit/observability-guide.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
docker/setup-buildx-action@v2 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
lines 72, 75, 98
.github/workflows/ci-cd.yml:72, 75, 98 (3 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in api/main.py:43
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
api/main.py:43 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'cors_wildcard' in main.py:23
Found a known-risky pattern (cors_wildcard). Review and replace if possible.
main.py:23 Cors wildcard
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in index/index.html:1308
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
index/index.html:1308 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in index/platform.html:639
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
index/platform.html:639 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/generate_metadata.py:36
`requests.get(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/pin_broski_pets_art.py:93
`requests.post(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/pinata_cid_export.py:40
`requests.get(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/pinata_pin_all_pets.py:76
`requests.post(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/pinata_to_supabase.py:42
`requests.post(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — scripts/upload_metadata.py:44
`requests.post(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 20 placeholder/mock markers across 9 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Runtime service client appears to use placeholder configuration
A runtime source file appears to wire Supabase/Firebase/AI/payment-style clients to placeholder URLs, keys, or fallback values. In the Fable corpus this often means the UI/API shape is present while the backend service is not actually configured.
Runtime configService clientGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 23 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example
Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `AGENT_API_KEY`, `BACKEND_SIGNER_PRIVATE_KEY`, `BASE_SEPOLIA_RPC`, `BROSKIPET_CONTRACT_ADDRESS`, `BROSKI_PET_EXTERNAL_URL_BASE`, `EVOLVE_COOLDOWN_HOURS`, `HYPERCODE_API_KEY`, `MINT_LIMIT` + 15 more. Add them (with a placeholder/comment) to .env.exa…
config drift
low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found
Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.
Deployment
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 116 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 2 occurrences Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: python:3.11-slim
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
lines 2, 20
Dockerfile:2, 20 (2 hits)
containersPinned dependencies
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/setup-python@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/ci-cd.yml:31 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio
6 tests / 31 src (ratio 0.19).
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 2 occurrences Near-duplicate function bodies in 2 places
Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: broski_pet_metadata.py:upload_image, broski_pet_metadata.py:upload This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://jw.hn/ai-code-hygiene). Consolidate or document why they're separate.
2 occurrences
repo-level (2 hits)
duplicatesduplication
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: do_GET
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
pet_evolver_agent.py:470
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: do_POST
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
pet_evolver_agent.py:458
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: log_message
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
pet_evolver_agent.py:482
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: save_metadata
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
metadata.py:162
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /
`main.py` declares `GET /` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /categories
`api/shop.py` declares `GET /categories` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /items
`api/shop.py` declares `GET /items` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /items/{item_id}
`api/shop.py` declares `GET /items/{item_id}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /pet/{pet_id}
`api/pet_bridge.py` declares `GET /pet/{pet_id}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /pet/{pet_id}/inventory
`api/shop.py` declares `GET /pet/{pet_id}/inventory` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /pet/{pet_id}/metadata
`api/pet_bridge.py` declares `GET /pet/{pet_id}/metadata` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /rewards/balance
`api/pet_bridge.py` declares `GET /rewards/balance` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /rewards/ledger
`api/pet_bridge.py` declares `GET /rewards/ledger` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /squad
`api/pet_bridge.py` declares `GET /squad` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /squad/{rarity}
`api/pet_bridge.py` declares `GET /squad/{rarity}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /{species}
`api/pets.py` declares `GET /{species}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /{species}/{evo_stage}
`api/pets.py` declares `GET /{species}/{evo_stage}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /evolve
`evolve_relay.py` declares `POST /evolve` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /pet/{pet_id}/chat
`api/pet_bridge.py` declares `POST /pet/{pet_id}/chat` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /pet/{pet_id}/evolve
`api/pet_bridge.py` declares `POST /pet/{pet_id}/evolve` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /pet/{pet_id}/feed
`api/pet_bridge.py` declares `POST /pet/{pet_id}/feed` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /purchase/{item_id}
`api/shop.py` declares `POST /purchase/{item_id}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /rewards/award
`api/pet_bridge.py` declares `POST /rewards/award` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
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