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strapi/documentation

https://github.com/strapi/documentation · scanned 2026-06-05 14:25 UTC (5 days, 5 hours ago) · 10 languages

87 findings 11/13 scanners ran 39th percentile · Javascript · small (2-20K LoC)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

25 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 62 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

Deeper analysis is still running. Current findings may grow as the 9-layer scanner finishes. This page refreshes automatically so the final totals replace the partial view.
Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5
Component Sub-score Weight Contribution
structure_score 40.0 0.15 6.00
security_score 100.0 0.25 25.00
testing_score 0.0 0.20 0.00
documentation_score 61.0 0.15 9.15
practices_score 59.0 0.15 8.85
code_quality 80.0 0.10 8.00
Overall 1.00 57.0
security_score may be inflated — optional security scanners were skipped on this fast scan
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: layer: cicd × excluding tests × Reset all

Showing 4 of 25 actionable findings. 87 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.35 ✓ Repobility 15 occurrences Workflow references repository secrets in a pull_request workflow
Fork pull_request runs do not receive normal repository secrets on GitHub Actions. Review this as a reliability/intent signal, not as direct fork-secret exfiltration. Raise severity only for pull_request_target or another trusted-context path that runs untrusted PR code with secrets.
2 files, 15 locations
.github/workflows/sync-content-to-next.yml:44, 158, 183, 199, 271, 311, 322, 347, +3 more (11 hits)
.github/workflows/meilisearch-scraper.yml:36, 37, 48, 49 (4 hits)
CI/CD securityworkflow secretsGitHub Actions
low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 21 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
[MINED115] Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4`: `uses: actions/checkout@v4` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lo…
10 files, 21 locations
.github/workflows/documentation-style-review-enhanced.yml:42, 47, 99, 370 (4 hits)
.github/workflows/debug-review.yml:16, 19, 106 (3 hits)
.github/workflows/documentation-review-github.yml:37, 42, 94 (3 hits)
.github/workflows/sync-content-to-next.yml:42, 196, 377 (3 hits)
.github/workflows/auto-label-prs-by-contributor-type.yml:23, 40 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/deploy-production.yml:17, 23 (2 hits)
.github/workflows/credit-reward-automation.yml:23
.github/workflows/documentation-review.yml:32
CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions
medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
[MINED115] Action `UnlyEd/github-action-await-vercel` pinned to mutable ref `@v1.2.14`: `uses: UnlyEd/[email protected]` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect …
lines 77, 89, 99
.github/workflows/deploy-production.yml:77, 89, 99 (3 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions
high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
[MINED115] Action `derrickmehaffy/vercel-preview-url` pinned to mutable ref `@main`: `uses: derrickmehaffy/vercel-preview-url@main` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K r…
.github/workflows/deploy-production.yml:67 CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions
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