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DooDoo3804/DooDoo3804.github.io

https://github.com/DooDoo3804/DooDoo3804.github.io · scanned 2026-06-17 01:27 UTC (1 month, 2 weeks ago)

26 raw signals (0 security + 26 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 2 weeks ago · v2 · last Δ -18.0 (diff) · 19 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 7 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
58.7
/100
Security checks
59
0 findings
System graph
59
77.8% cov · 19 findings
Critical
1
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 1 High 0 Medium 14 Low 3 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 19 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 1 Security 8 Cicd 3 Quality 7
Corpus Intelligence Cross-corpus context (cohort percentile, top patterns, fix plan) is shown only on repositories you own. Sign up and connect your repo to view it.
Scan summary Repository scanned at 58.7/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 227 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 26 findings — concentrated in cicd (10), security (8), quality (7). Risk profile is high: 1 critical, 0 high, 15 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 18 of 19 actionable findings. 26 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical System graph security Secrets conf 1.00 Possible secret in scripts/encrypt-pages.sh
Detected pattern matching password_literal. Rotate the credential and move to a secret manager.
scripts/encrypt-pages.sh:10
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — sw.js:43
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/settings.local.json
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/settings.local.json VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected
A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.
CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
ruby/setup-ruby@v1 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
2 files, 2 locations
.github/workflows/ci-dryrun.yml:26
.github/workflows/deploy.yml:25
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/deploy.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in _includes/footer.html:55
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
_includes/footer.html:55 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in graph.html:167
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
graph.html:167 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in js/custom.js:166
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
js/custom.js:166 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in js/custom.min.js:6
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
js/custom.min.js:6 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in js/index.js:95
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
js/index.js:95 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in js/snackbar.js:44
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
js/snackbar.js:44 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in js/toc.js:53
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
js/toc.js:53 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio
0 test file(s) for 9 source file(s) (ratio 0.00). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.
Coverage
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 5 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 7 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/checkout@v6 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
2 files, 7 locations
.github/workflows/deploy.yml:22, 33, 80, 96 (4 hits)
.github/workflows/ci-dryrun.yml:23, 32, 82 (3 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — scripts/generate-og-images.js:244
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
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