Public scan — anyone with this URL can view this analysis. Sign up to track your own repos privately, run scheduled re-scans, and get AI fix prompts via your dashboard.
Sign up free Scan another repo

gallery

https://github.com/google-ai-edge/gallery.git · scanned 2026-05-17 03:24 UTC (12 hours, 57 minutes ago) · 10 languages

45 findings (21 legacy + 24 scanner) Scanner says 90 (lower by 33)

File as issue Image
UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 12 hours, 57 minutes ago · v2 · 33 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
76.6
/100
Repobility
64
21 legacy
9-layer
90
77.8% cov · 12 gaps
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: high × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 5 Medium 4 Low 21 Source: Legacy 21 9-layer 12 Crowd 0 Layer: Security 3 Quality 18 Software 3 Api 1 Frontend 2 Cicd 6
Scan summary Repository scanned at 89.7/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 553 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 12 findings — concentrated in cicd (6), frontend (2), quality (2). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 3 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 5 of 33 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy security path_traversal conf 0.80 [SEC013] Path Traversal — User Input in File Path: User-controlled input used in file path without sanitization. Allows reading arbitrary files.
Use os.path.realpath() and verify the path starts with your expected base directory. Use secure_filename() for uploads.
Android/src/app/src/main/java/com/google/ai/edge/gallery/customtasks/agentchat/SkillManagerViewModel.kt:184 path_traversallegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
Android/src/app/src/main/java/com/google/ai/edge/gallery/customtasks/agentchat/AddSkillFromFeaturedListBottomSheet.kt:114 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
Android/src/app/src/main/java/com/google/ai/edge/gallery/common/Utils.kt:76 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
Android/src/app/src/main/java/com/google/ai/edge/gallery/FcmMessagingService.kt:103 ssrflegacy
high Legacy quality testing No test files found
Add a test directory (tests/ or __tests__/) with unit tests for core functionality. Use pytest (Python), Jest (JS/TS), or go test (Go). Start with tests for critical business logic and security-sensitive functions.
testinglegacy
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
For AI agents + API integrations
Email me when this repo regresses
Free. We re-scan periodically; new criticals → your inbox. No signup required for the scan itself.
API access

This page is publicly accessible at: https://repobility.com/scan/329edd7e-4b0b-4a56-a4f1-b89a21424c7f/

To check status programmatically (no auth required): 

curl -s https://repobility.com/api/v1/public/scan/329edd7e-4b0b-4a56-a4f1-b89a21424c7f/

Important — please don't re-submit the same URL repeatedly. The submission endpoint is idempotent: re-submitting the same git URL returns this same scan_token, not a new one. To re-scan this repo, sign up free and use the dashboard.