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lightseekorg/tokenspeed

https://github.com/lightseekorg/tokenspeed · scanned 2026-05-16 22:31 UTC (18 hours, 53 minutes ago) · 10 languages

746 findings (51 legacy + 695 scanner) 58th percentile · Python · large (100-500K LoC) Scanner says 70 (higher by 3)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 18 hours, 53 minutes ago · v1 · 746 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
68.1
/100
Repobility
67
51 legacy
9-layer
70
88.9% cov · 695 gaps
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: high × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 15 Medium 18 Low 213 Source: Legacy 51 9-layer 695 Crowd 0 Layer: Cicd 47 Security 11 Quality 626 Software 48 Hardware 3 Frontend 1 Api 10
Scan summary Repository scanned at 69.6/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 6761 nodes across 12 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 695 findings — concentrated in quality (586), software (45), cicd (43). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 7 high, 13 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 15 of 746 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
python/tokenspeed/runtime/pd/mini_lb.py:60 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
python/tokenspeed/runtime/cache/storage/mooncake_store/mooncake_store.py:288 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
python/tokenspeed/bench.py:285 ssrflegacy
high Legacy cicd docker conf 0.95 Docker final stage runs as root
The final runtime stage explicitly uses root. A compromised app process would have root inside the container.
docker/Dockerfile:4 dockerlegacy
high 9-layer security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `flush_cache` without auth dependency — python/tokenspeed/runtime/pd/mini_lb.py:433
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
python/tokenspeed/runtime/pd/mini_lb.py:433 authowaspauth.fastapi.unauth_mutation
high 9-layer security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `handle_chat_completion_request` without auth dependency — python/tokenspeed/runtime/pd/mini_lb.py:585
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
python/tokenspeed/runtime/pd/mini_lb.py:585 authowaspauth.fastapi.unauth_mutation
high 9-layer security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `handle_completion_request` without auth dependency — python/tokenspeed/runtime/pd/mini_lb.py:590
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
python/tokenspeed/runtime/pd/mini_lb.py:590 authowaspauth.fastapi.unauth_mutation
high 9-layer security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `handle_generate_request` without auth dependency — python/tokenspeed/runtime/pd/mini_lb.py:494
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
python/tokenspeed/runtime/pd/mini_lb.py:494 authowaspauth.fastapi.unauth_mutation
high 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Action tracks a moving branch
jlumbroso/free-disk-space@main can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/release-docker.yml:24 supply-chaingithub-actionspinned-dependencies
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in python/tokenspeed/runtime/model_loader/loader.py:397
Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.
python/tokenspeed/runtime/model_loader/loader.py:397 owaspeval_used
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in python/tokenspeed/runtime/models/extensible.py:150
Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.
python/tokenspeed/runtime/models/extensible.py:150 owaspeval_used
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
python/tokenspeed/runtime/models/deepseek_v4.py:2808 error_handlinglegacy
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
python/tokenspeed/runtime/layers/deepseek_v4_mhc.py:62 error_handlinglegacy
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
python/tokenspeed/_logging.py:109 error_handlinglegacy
high Legacy cicd docker conf 0.76 Dockerfile copies broad context with incomplete .dockerignore
COPY . or ADD . is safer when .dockerignore excludes secrets, git history, keys, and generated artifacts.
docker/Dockerfile:11 dockerlegacy
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
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