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TrainLCD/MobileApp

https://github.com/TrainLCD/MobileApp · scanned 2026-06-16 00:41 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

56 raw signals (0 security + 56 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 52 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 4 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 52 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 15 Low 17 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 52 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 10 Security 3 Cicd 5 Quality 34

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 78.8/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 1705 nodes across 4 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 56 findings — concentrated in quality (34), frontend (10), cicd (9). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 17 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 33 of 52 actionable findings. 56 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'exec_used' in utils/image.js:11

Found a known-risky pattern (exec_used). Review and replace if possible.

utils/image.js:11 Exec used

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — functions/src/funcs/tts.ts:135

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — functions/src/workers/__tests__/googlePlayReviews.test.ts:47

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — functions/src/workers/appStoreReviewNotifier.ts:216

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/hooks/useFeedback.ts:148

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/lib/routeResolver.ts:142

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/create-canary-pr/SKILL.md

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/skills/create-canary-pr/SKILL.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/finalize-release/SKILL.md

.claude/skills/finalize-release/SKILL.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/plan-from-feedback/SKILL.md

.claude/skills/plan-from-feedback/SKILL.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/publish-release/SKILL.md

.claude/skills/publish-release/SKILL.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

peter-evans/create-pull-request@v7 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

3 files, 3 locations

.github/workflows/bump_version_on_canary_pr.yml:55

.github/workflows/bump_version_on_release_pr.yml:127

.github/workflows/code_quality.yml:14

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/bump_version_on_canary_pr.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/bump_version_on_release_pr.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in utils/image.js:2

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

utils/image.js:2 Node child process

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 33 placeholder/mock markers across 17 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 29 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example

Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `APPSTORE_REVIEW_FEED_URL`, `APPSTORE_REVIEW_STATE_GCS_URI`, `DISCORD_CRASH_WEBHOOK_URL`, `DISCORD_CS_WEBHOOK_URL`, `DISCORD_REVIEW_WEBHOOK_URL`, `EAS_BUILD_PROFILE`, `EAS_BUILD_PROJECT_ID`, `FEW_SHOT_GCS_URI` + 21 more. Add them (with a placeholde…

config drift

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 54 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

3 files, 3 locations

.github/workflows/code_quality.yml:12

.github/workflows/test.yml:21

.github/workflows/typecheck.yml:21

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 package.json defines install-time lifecycle scripts

preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare scripts execute during dependency installation. Review them carefully for network calls, obfuscation, shell execution, or credential access.

package.json CI/CD securitySupply chainNpm

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — functions/src/cli/find-orphaned-tts.ts:113