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47 of your 81 findings came from Repobility's proprietary detections. ✓ Repobility tags below mark them.
Upstream (GitHub) caused delay on this scan — not Repobility.
  • GitHub API rate-limited (HTTP 403) — preflight skipped, fell back to direct git clone.
  • Clone from GitHub took 90.22s for a 213.2 MB repo slow.
  • Repobility's analysis ran in 10.66s after the clone landed.

ZHOURUIH/MyFramework

https://github.com/ZHOURUIH/MyFramework · scanned 2026-06-05 17:25 UTC (4 days, 21 hours ago) · 10 languages

82 raw signals (74 security + 8 graph) 11/13 scanners ran System graph score 100 (lower by 43)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 4 days, 21 hours ago · v2 · 50 actionable findings from 2 signal sources. 27 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
82.7
/100
Security checks
66
46 findings
System graph
100
66.7% cov · 4 findings
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5
Component Sub-score Weight Contribution
structure_score 40.0 0.15 6.00
security_score 100.0 0.25 25.00
testing_score 35.0 0.20 7.00
documentation_score 40.0 0.15 6.00
practices_score 30.0 0.15 4.50
code_quality 80.0 0.10 8.00
Overall 1.00 56.5
security_score may be inflated — optional security scanners were skipped on this fast scan
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 29 Medium 4 Low 2 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 46 System graph 4 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 17 Software 29 Api 1 Frontend 1 Security 1 Cicd 1
Scan summary Quality grade C (56/100). Dimensions: security 100, maintainability 40. 74 findings (25 security). 205,126 lines analyzed.

Showing 35 of 50 actionable findings. 77 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED017] C System Call: system() invokes shell. command injection if any arg is dynamic.
Review and fix per the pattern semantics. See CWE-78 / for context.
ToolProject/CodeGenerator/Game/main.cpp:18
high Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED017] C System Call: system() invokes shell. command injection if any arg is dynamic.
Review and fix per the pattern semantics. See CWE-78 / for context.
ToolProject/AtlasPacker/AtlasPacker/main.cpp:15
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `Analyzers/AnalyzerUnity.dll` committed in source repo: `Analyzers/AnalyzerUnity.dll` is a .dll binary (12,800 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
Analyzers/AnalyzerUnity.dll:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `AndroidProject/gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar` committed in source repo: `AndroidProject/gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar` is a .jar binary (53,636 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
AndroidProject/gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `Assets/3rdParty/codeandweb.com/Editor/TexturePackerImporter.dll` committed in source repo: `Assets/3rdParty/codeandweb.com/Editor/TexturePackerImporter.dll` is a .dll binary (27,136 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
Assets/3rdParty/codeandweb.com/Editor/TexturePackerImporter.dll:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `Assets/3rdParty/UnityObfuscator/Plugins/Cecil/Mono.Cecil.dll` committed in source repo: `Assets/3rdParty/UnityObfuscator/Plugins/Cecil/Mono.Cecil.dll` is a .dll binary (301,056 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
Assets/3rdParty/UnityObfuscator/Plugins/Cecil/Mono.Cecil.dll:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `Assets/3rdParty/UnityObfuscator/Plugins/Cecil/Mono.Cecil.Mdb.dll` committed in source repo: `Assets/3rdParty/UnityObfuscator/Plugins/Cecil/Mono.Cecil.Mdb.dll` is a .dll binary (43,520 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
Assets/3rdParty/UnityObfuscator/Plugins/Cecil/Mono.Cecil.Mdb.dll:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `Assets/3rdParty/UnityObfuscator/Plugins/Cecil/Mono.Cecil.Pdb.dll` committed in source repo: `Assets/3rdParty/UnityObfuscator/Plugins/Cecil/Mono.Cecil.Pdb.dll` is a .dll binary (79,360 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
Assets/3rdParty/UnityObfuscator/Plugins/Cecil/Mono.Cecil.Pdb.dll:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `Assets/Plugins/Android/audio360-exo28.jar` committed in source repo: `Assets/Plugins/Android/audio360-exo28.jar` is a .jar binary (10,766 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
Assets/Plugins/Android/audio360-exo28.jar:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `Assets/Plugins/Android/audio360.jar` committed in source repo: `Assets/Plugins/Android/audio360.jar` is a .jar binary (64,885 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
Assets/Plugins/Android/audio360.jar:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `Assets/Plugins/Android/AVProVideo.jar` committed in source repo: `Assets/Plugins/Android/AVProVideo.jar` is a .jar binary (181,006 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
Assets/Plugins/Android/AVProVideo.jar:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `Assets/Plugins/Android/exoplayer2-dash.jar` committed in source repo: `Assets/Plugins/Android/exoplayer2-dash.jar` is a .jar binary (116,488 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
Assets/Plugins/Android/exoplayer2-dash.jar:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `Assets/Plugins/Android/exoplayer2-hls.jar` committed in source repo: `Assets/Plugins/Android/exoplayer2-hls.jar` is a .jar binary (96,965 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
Assets/Plugins/Android/exoplayer2-hls.jar:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `Assets/Plugins/Android/exoplayer2-smoothstreaming.jar` committed in source repo: `Assets/Plugins/Android/exoplayer2-smoothstreaming.jar` is a .jar binary (49,237 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
Assets/Plugins/Android/exoplayer2-smoothstreaming.jar:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `Assets/Plugins/Android/exoplayer2.jar` committed in source repo: `Assets/Plugins/Android/exoplayer2.jar` is a .jar binary (1,426,335 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
Assets/Plugins/Android/exoplayer2.jar:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `Assets/Plugins/Android/zip_file.jar` committed in source repo: `Assets/Plugins/Android/zip_file.jar` is a .jar binary (12,406 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
Assets/Plugins/Android/zip_file.jar:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `Assets/Plugins/iOS/libAVProVideoiOS.a` committed in source repo: `Assets/Plugins/iOS/libAVProVideoiOS.a` is a .a binary (5,581,200 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
Assets/Plugins/iOS/libAVProVideoiOS.a:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `Assets/Plugins/Mono.Data.Sqlite.dll` committed in source repo: `Assets/Plugins/Mono.Data.Sqlite.dll` is a .dll binary (169,984 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
Assets/Plugins/Mono.Data.Sqlite.dll:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `Assets/Plugins/x86/Audio360.dll` committed in source repo: `Assets/Plugins/x86/Audio360.dll` is a .dll binary (1,630,208 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
Assets/Plugins/x86/Audio360.dll:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `Assets/Plugins/x86/sqlite3.dll` committed in source repo: `Assets/Plugins/x86/sqlite3.dll` is a .dll binary (456,552 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
Assets/Plugins/x86/sqlite3.dll:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `ToolProject/AtlasPacker/FreeImage.dll` committed in source repo: `ToolProject/AtlasPacker/FreeImage.dll` is a .dll binary (5,647,872 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
ToolProject/AtlasPacker/FreeImage.dll:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `自动处理工具/AtlasPacker/AtlasPacker.exe` committed in source repo: `自动处理工具/AtlasPacker/AtlasPacker.exe` is a .exe binary (62,976 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
自动处理工具/AtlasPacker/AtlasPacker.exe:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `自动处理工具/AtlasPacker/FreeImage.dll` committed in source repo: `自动处理工具/AtlasPacker/FreeImage.dll` is a .dll binary (5,647,872 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
自动处理工具/AtlasPacker/FreeImage.dll:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `自动处理工具/ExcelConverter/ExcelConverter.dll` committed in source repo: `自动处理工具/ExcelConverter/ExcelConverter.dll` is a .dll binary (59,904 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
自动处理工具/ExcelConverter/ExcelConverter.dll:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `自动处理工具/ExcelConverter/ExcelConverter.exe` committed in source repo: `自动处理工具/ExcelConverter/ExcelConverter.exe` is a .exe binary (157,696 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
自动处理工具/ExcelConverter/ExcelConverter.exe:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `自动处理工具/ExcelConverter/ExcelDataReader.DataSet.dll` committed in source repo: `自动处理工具/ExcelConverter/ExcelDataReader.DataSet.dll` is a .dll binary (9,728 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
自动处理工具/ExcelConverter/ExcelDataReader.DataSet.dll:1
high Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED134] Binary file `自动处理工具/ExcelConverter/ExcelDataReader.dll` committed in source repo: `自动处理工具/ExcelConverter/ExcelDataReader.dll` is a .dll binary (161,280 bytes) committed to a repo that otherwise has 1202 source files. Trojan binaries inside otherwise-normal source repos are a known supply-chain attack: a compromised dependency or PR slips in a binary that gets executed by build scripts.
Audit the binary's provenance. If it's vendored library code, document it in a VENDORED.md. If it's a build artifact, add the extension to .gitignore and rebuild from source.
自动处理工具/ExcelConverter/ExcelDataReader.dll:1
high Security checks software Xxe conf 1.00 [SEC025] XML External Entity (XXE) — .NET XmlDocument / XmlTextReader: .NET XmlDocument and XmlTextReader expand external entities by default in pre-4.5.2 runtimes (and even later if XmlResolver is left at default). Allows file disclosure and SSRF via XXE.
Set XmlResolver = null on XmlDocument before Load. On XmlReader, pass XmlReaderSettings { DtdProcessing = DtdProcessing.Prohibit, XmlResolver = null }. Prefer XDocument / XElement which don't expand external entities by default.
Assets/Scripts/Frame_HotFix/Common/ObsSystem.cs:242
high Security checks software Xxe conf 1.00 [SEC025] XML External Entity (XXE) — .NET XmlDocument / XmlTextReader: .NET XmlDocument and XmlTextReader expand external entities by default in pre-4.5.2 runtimes (and even later if XmlResolver is left at default). Allows file disclosure and SSRF via XXE.
Set XmlResolver = null on XmlDocument before Load. On XmlReader, pass XmlReaderSettings { DtdProcessing = DtdProcessing.Prohibit, XmlResolver = null }. Prefer XDocument / XElement which don't expand external entities by default.
Assets/Scripts/Frame_Game/Common/ObsSystem.cs:56
medium Security checks quality Practices conf 1.00 [CFG006] Missing .gitignore: No .gitignore file. Risk of committing secrets and build artifacts.
Add a .gitignore appropriate for your language/framework.
medium Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 [SEC123] Production stack trace / debug output exposed: Debug mode left on in production exposes stack traces, environment variables, framework internals — sometimes triggers RCE (Django debug page with arbitrary template eval).
Set DEBUG=False / APP_DEBUG=false in production. Provide a generic 500 handler that logs to backend but returns a sanitized page to clients.
ToolProject/AtlasPacker/AtlasPacker/Memory/txMemoryTrace.cpp:31
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). Either auth lives in custom code, in a separate service, or is missing.
auth
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected
No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.
CI/CD securityCoverage
low Security checks quality Quality conf 0.60 16 occurrences Duplicated implementation block across source files
Duplicate implementation blocks are maintenance debt. Keep them visible, but they are not a high-severity defect unless the duplicated logic is security-sensitive or drifting.
12 files, 12 locations
Assets/3rdParty/AVProVideo/Scripts/Components/ApplyToMesh.cs:65
Assets/Editor/Frame/EditorWindow/GameInspector.cs:58
Assets/Editor/Frame/EditorWindow/UGUISubGeneratorInspector.cs:86
Assets/Scripts/Frame_Game/ScriptStaticAttach/ResLocalizationText.cs:79
Assets/Scripts/Frame_HotFix/Android/AndroidAssetLoader.cs:55
Assets/Scripts/Frame_HotFix/AssetVersionSystem/AssetVersionSystem.cs:39
Assets/Scripts/Frame_HotFix/CommandSystem/CmdTransformable/CmdTransformableMoveCurveSpan.cs:10
Assets/Scripts/Frame_HotFix/CommandSystem/CmdWindow/CmdWindowSlider.cs:19
duplicationquality
low Security checks quality Documentation No LICENSE file
Add a LICENSE file to your repository. Use choosealicense.com to pick the right license (MIT for permissive, Apache 2.0 for patent protection, GPL for copyleft).
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