samdotson61/jobdar-app — Repobility public scan

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samdotson61/jobdar-app

https://github.com/samdotson61/jobdar-app · scanned 2026-06-16 00:00 UTC (2 months, 3 weeks ago)

57 raw signals (0 security + 57 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 3 weeks ago · v1 · 57 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Security checks

77.8% cov · 57 findings

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Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 3 Medium 20 Low 5 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 57 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 1 Security 8 Quality 48

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 63.5/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 588 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 57 findings — concentrated in quality (48), security (8), frontend (1). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 3 high, 20 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 27 of 57 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in AGENTS.md:58

Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.

AGENTS.md:58 Eval used

high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in config/i18n/en.yml:15

Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.

config/i18n/en.yml:15 Eval used

high System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in config/i18n/es.yml:257

Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.

config/i18n/es.yml:257 Eval used

medium System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — apps/jobdar/app/+html.tsx:23

Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html

Fq dangerous html

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — apps/jobdar/app/(tabs)/index.tsx:32

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/inference.mjs:193

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — providers/_contract.mjs:9

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — providers/ashby.mjs:4

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — providers/greenhouse.mjs:6

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — providers/icims.mjs:206

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — providers/lever.mjs:54

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — providers/workday.mjs:10

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: CLAUDE.md

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

CLAUDE.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing

AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing tests. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.

Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 CI is configured but no tests are detected

A CI pipeline exists, but the scan found no test files to gate. Opus labeled this generated-code pattern as config theater: release machinery exists, but it has little behavioral signal.

CI/CDConfig theaterRepo hardening

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in apps/jobdar/app/+html.tsx:23

Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.

apps/jobdar/app/+html.tsx:23 Dangerous innerhtml

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in lib/commands/backend.mjs:7

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

lib/commands/backend.mjs:7 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in lib/commands/tui.mjs:10

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

lib/commands/tui.mjs:10 Node child process

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in lib/docparse.mjs:9

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

lib/docparse.mjs:9 Node child process

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 24 placeholder/mock markers across 8 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Very low test-to-source ratio

1 test file(s) for 73 source file(s) (ratio 0.01). Consider adding integration or unit tests for critical paths.

Coverage

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 200 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Multiple root agent instruction files without precedence

The repo has multiple top-level AI-coder instruction files. Without precedence rules, different agents may follow different policies.

Governance

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `node_old` in doctor.mjs:41

Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.

old markerDead code

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: test-all.mjs (1486 lines)

Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.

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