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arcsignio/arcsign

https://github.com/arcsignio/arcsign · scanned 2026-06-17 01:35 UTC (1 month, 2 weeks ago)

100 raw signals (0 security + 100 graph)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 2 weeks ago · v2 · last Δ -4.2 (diff) · 100 actionable findings from 1 signal source. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 100 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

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Severity: Critical 0 High 0 Medium 11 Low 61 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 100 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 63 Security 3 Cicd 4 Quality 30

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 72.5/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 1452 nodes across 9 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 100 findings — concentrated in frontend (63), quality (30), cicd (4). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 11 medium. Recommended next step: open the frontend layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 72 of 100 actionable findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — contracts/scripts/upload-metadata.js:47

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — dashboard/src/services/analytics.ts:35

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — dashboard/src/services/tokenList.ts:120

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: CLAUDE.md

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

CLAUDE.md VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

tim-actions/[email protected] can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/dco.yml:20 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

.github/workflows/release.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in dashboard/src/components/WalletDetail.tsx:2033

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

dashboard/src/components/WalletDetail.tsx:2033 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in dashboard/src/constants/README.md:114

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

dashboard/src/constants/README.md:114 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected

The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.

auth

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 132 placeholder/mock markers across 49 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

low System graph quality Maintenance conf 1.00 458 TODO/FIXME markers

High count of TODO/FIXME/HACK markers — track them as issues so they're not forgotten.

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 7 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example

Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `BASE_URI`, `DEV`, `ETHERSCAN_API_KEY`, `PINATA_API_KEY`, `PINATA_SECRET_KEY`, `RPC_URL`, `TAURI_DEBUG`. Add them (with a placeholder/comment) to .env.example so onboarding doesn't break.

config drift

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 837 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/upload-artifact@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/gitleaks.yml:42 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Icon-only button without accessible name — dashboard/src/components/WalletConnect/SessionsManagerModal.tsx:111

A `<button>` whose only child is a single glyph or symbol needs `title=` or `aria-label=` so screen readers (and tooltips on hover) work. Why: P3 in CHECKLIST.md — icon-only buttons skipped a title. Rule id: fq.button.no-label

Fq button no label

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `export_backup` in dashboard/src/services/tauri-api.ts:216

Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.

old markerDead code

low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 Old/deprecated-named symbol `export_backup` in dashboard/tests/frontend/services/tauri-api.test.ts:281

Names with suffixes like `_old`, `_v1`, `_deprecated` usually indicate replaced-but-not-removed code (typical AI-coder leftover). Confirm and delete, or rename if it's the active version.

old markerDead code

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 package.json defines install-time lifecycle scripts

preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare scripts execute during dependency installation. Review them carefully for network calls, obfuscation, shell execution, or credential access.

packages/hardhat-plugin/package.json CI/CD securitySupply chainNpm

low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — contracts/scripts/check-uri.js:13