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cubes321/directive

https://github.com/cubes321/directive · scanned 2026-06-17 01:52 UTC (1 month, 1 week ago)

13 raw signals (0 security + 13 graph)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 1 week ago · v2 · last Δ +4.7 (diff) · 11 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 2 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 81.4/100 with 55.6% coverage. It contains 428 nodes across 7 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 13 findings — concentrated in security (7), quality (6). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 5 high, 4 medium. Recommended next step: open the security layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 11 of 11 actionable findings. 13 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `converse` without auth dependency — server/app.py:241
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
server/app.py:241 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `dismiss` without auth dependency — server/app.py:225
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
server/app.py:225 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `end_turn` without auth dependency — server/app.py:210
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
server/app.py:210 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `new_game` without auth dependency — server/app.py:187
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
server/app.py:187 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `set_directives` without auth dependency — server/app.py:198
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
server/app.py:198 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing ci. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in web/app.js:197
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
web/app.js:197 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 49 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 3 occurrences Near-duplicate function bodies in 2 places
Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: commanders/campaign.py:dismissal_cost, commanders/campaign.py:dismiss This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://jw.hn/ai-code-hygiene). Consolidate or document why they're separate.
3 occurrences
repo-level (3 hits)
duplicatesduplication
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